The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Open-ended
Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations established by the
General Assembly in its resolution 70/33 to substantively address concrete effective legal
measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a
world without nuclear weapons and also to substantively address recommendations on other
measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,
including but not limited to: (a) transparency measures related to the risks associated with
existing nuclear weapons; (b) measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken,
unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations; and (c) additional measures to increase
awareness and understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the wide range
of humanitarian consequences that would result from any nuclear detonation.
Report of the Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiations
Contents
I. Introduction
II. Organizational matters
III. Proceedings of the Open-ended Working Group
IV. Substantive discussions
V. Conclusions and agreed recommendations
VI. Adoption of the report
Annexes
I. Measures proposed under the progressive approach
II. Suggested elements for effective legal measures that could be included in an international
legal instrument
III. List of documents submitted by the Chair, Member States, international organizations,
institutions and non-governmental organizations
1. In its resolution 70/33, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations", the General Assembly reiterated that the universal objective of taking forward
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations remains the achievement and maintenance of a
world without nuclear weapons, and emphasized the importance of addressing issues related to
nuclear weapons in a comprehensive, inclusive, interactive and constructive manner, for the
advancement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.
2. By paragraphs 2 and 3 of that same resolution, the General Assembly decided to convene an
open-ended working group to substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal
provisions and norms that would need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without
nuclear weapons, and to also substantively address recommendations on other measures that
could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including but
not limited to: (a) transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear
weapons; (b) measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or
intentional nuclear weapon detonations; and (c) additional measures to increase awareness and
understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian
consequences that would result from any nuclear detonation.
3. By paragraph 7 of the same resolution, the General Assembly also decided that the open-ended working group should submit a report on its substantive work and agreed
recommendations to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, which would assess
progress made, taking into account developments in other relevant forums. The present report is
submitted pursuant to that request.
4. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 70/33, the Open-ended Working Group held an organizational meeting on 28 January 2016 at which the Chair
was nominated and a provisional agenda circulated. The Working Group held a total of 30
substantive meetings, from 22 to 26 February, from 2 to 4 and from 9 to 13 May and on 5, 16, 17
and 19 August 2016. A number of informal meetings were also held.
5. The Office for Disarmament Affairs provided substantive support to the Working Group.
6. The first plenary meeting was opened by the Acting Director of the Geneva branch of the
Office for Disarmament Affairs, who oversaw the election of the Chair of the Working Group.
7. At its first plenary meeting, on 22 February 2016, the Working Group elected by acclamation
Thani Thongphakdi (Thailand) as its Chair.
8. At the same meeting, the Working Group adopted its agenda (A/AC.286/1), which read as
follows:
1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chairperson.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. Organization of work.
5. Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations:
(a) Concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded
to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons;
(b) Recommendations on other measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral
nuclear disarmament negotiations, including but not limited to:
(i) Transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons;
(ii) Measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or
intentional nuclear weapon detonations;
(iii) Additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of and
interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from
any nuclear detonation.
6. Report to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session.
7. Any other business.
9. At the same meeting, the Working Group decided on the modalities for the broad participation
of representatives of international organizations, civil society and academia in its work in
accordance to the provisions of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 70/33.
10. The Working Group had before it the following:
(a) Provisional agenda, submitted by the Chair-designate (A/AC.286/1);
(b) Synthesis paper, submitted by the Chair (A/AC.286/2).
11. The Working Group also had before it a number of working papers submitted by the Chair,
Member States, international organizations, institutions and non-governmental organizations, a
list of which appears in annex III to the present report.
12. Pursuant to its mandate, as contained in General Assembly resolution 70/33, the Working
Group addressed, in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, various issues related to nuclear
disarmament, including: possible pathways to nuclear disarmament; what would constitute
effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and
maintain a world without nuclear weapons; and other measures that could contribute to taking
forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. Deliberations were carried out without
prejudice to the eventual outcome or to national positions, which allowed for a frank,
constructive and participatory discussion on the different topics under its mandate.
13. The Working Group recalled that the General Assembly had encouraged all Member States
to participate in the Working Group, and in this connection, the Group regretted that the nuclear-weapon States and other States possessing nuclear weapons had not participated in its work.
14. The Working Group welcomed the participation and contributions of international
organizations and civil society.
15. The Working Group heard addresses by: Kofi Annan, former Secretary -General of the
United Nations; Michael Meller, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva,
Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament; Kim Won-soo, Under-Secretary-General
and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs; and Setsuko Thurlow, a nuclear bomb
survivor.
B. Deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group
16. In order to take stock of the current status of multilateral nuclear disarmament, the Open-ended Working Group held a thematic discussion, with the participation of Elayne Whyte
Gomez, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations Office at Geneva, on the
results achieved by the Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear
weapons in 2013 (see A/68/514), and Tim Caughley, Resident Senior Fellow, United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), on developments in the field of nuclear
disarmament since 2013.
17. The deliberations of the Working Group during its meetings from 22 to 26 February 2016
were structured around the work of the following two panels:
(a) Panel I: on substantively addressing concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and
norms that would need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons,
with Gro Nystuen, International Law and Policy Institute, Rebecca Johnson, Acronym Institute
for Disarmament Diplomacy, Kathleen Lawand, International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), and Louis Maresca, ICRC, taking part as panellists;
(b) Panel II: on substantively addressing recommendations on other measures that could
contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations: (i) transparency
measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons; (ii) measures to reduce
and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon
detonations; (iii) additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity
of and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result
from any nuclear detonation; and (iv) other measures, with Tariq Rauf, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, Beyza Unal, Chatham House, Pavel Podvig, UNIDIR, and John Borrie,
UNIDIR, taking part as panellists.
18. The deliberations of the Working Group during its meetings from 2 to 4 and from 9 to 13
May 2016 were structured around six panels, as follows:
(a) Panel I: on measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized
or intentional nuclear weapon detonations, with Patricia Lewis, Chatham House, taking part as a
panellist;
(b) Panel II: on transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear
weapons, with Piet de Klerk, International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification,
taking part as a panellist;
(c) Panel III: on additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity
of and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result
from any nuclear detonation, with Ira Helfand, International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War, and Sara Sekkenes, United Nations Development Programme, taking part as
panellists;
(d) Panel IV: on essential elements that would comprise effective legal measures, legal
provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without
nuclear weapons, with Stuart Casey-Maslen, University of Pretoria, taking part as a panellist;
(e) Panel V: on possible pathways to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations, with Nick Ritchie, University of York, taking part as a panellist;
(f) Panel VI: on other measures, including reviewing the role of nuclear weapons in the security
and other contexts of the twenty -first century, with James E. Cartwright, Global Zero
Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, and Paul Ingram, British American Security
Information Council, taking part as panellists.
19. The Open-ended Working Group reaffirmed the resolve to achieve and maintain a world
without nuclear weapons, which remains the universal objective of taking forward multilateral
nuclear disarmament negotiations. The Working Group emphasized the importance of
addressing issues related to nuclear weapons in a comprehensive, inclusive, interactive and
constructive manner for the purpose of the advancement of multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations. In this regard, the Working Group recalled the unequivocal undertaking by the
nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to bring about the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
20. The work of the Working Group was underpinned by deep concern about the threat to
humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of any nuclear weapon detonation. The risk of these catastrophic humanitarian
consequences will remain as long as nuclear weapons exist. The increased awareness of and
well-documented presentations on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons compel urgent
and necessary action by all States, leading to a world without nuclear weapons. The Working
Group also reaffirmed the need for all States to comply at all times with applicable international
law, including international humanitarian law.
21. Against these considerations and the growing awareness of the humanitarian impact of
nuclear weapons, it was noted with concern that progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament
has been slow. Concern was also raised regarding the serious challenges faced by the existing
United Nations disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament, which has
not been able to carry out negotiations pursuant to an agreed programme of work in two decades,
and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which has not produced a substantive
outcome since 1999, as well as the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at which the parties had failed to reach an agreement on
a substantive final document.
22. The Working Group discussed the current status of the international nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation regime with a view to identifying areas where additional legal measures,
provisions and norms need to be elaborated or concluded in order to attain and maintain a world
without nuclear weapons.
23. The Working Group recalled that article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons established an obligation on each of the States parties to, inter alia, pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. In addition, the Working
Group, while recalling the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
reaffirmed the need for the full implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of decision 2, entitled
"Principles and objectives for nuclear non -proliferation and disarmament", the practical steps
for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed upon by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as
well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed upon at the 2010
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
24. The Working Group noted that the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons does not provide specific guidance with respect to specific effective measures that
should be pursued in fulfilment of its article VI. The Working Group noted that the development
of effective legal measures has been required for the implementation of the nuclear disarmament
obligation contained in article VI.
25. Many States expressed the view that there is a legal gap in the current international
framework for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. They further noted that other
legal measures that may be required to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons,
such as general prohibitions against the possession, use, development, production, stockpiling
and transfer of such weapons, as well as measures for their elimination, have yet to be
considered in detail and must be negotiated with urgency.
26. On the other hand, a number of States did not consider that there was any legal gap in the
current international framework for nuclear disarmament. They expressed the view that the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the outcomes of its review conferences
provide an essential framework for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
27. A number of States stressed that the international security environment, the current
geopolitical situation and the role of nuclear weapons in existing security doctrines should be
taken into account in the pursuit of any effective measures for nuclear disarmament. They argued
that approaches that did not take these factors into account would not succeed in bringing about
the participation of nuclear-armed States and other States that rely on nuclear weapons in their
security doctrines. They noted the importance of confidence-building measures as a means for
creating conditions to facilitate further major reductions in nuclear arsenals, including efforts to
reduce levels of hostility and tensions between States, particularly between those possessing
nuclear weapons.
28. On the other hand, many States stressed that collective security should take priority over
national interest with respect to the question of nuclear weapons. They argued that there is no
contradiction between national security and collective security. In this regard, they noted that
from the humanitarian perspective, the consequences of nuclear weapons on human populations
and the risks and threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons had been examined
in the context of the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (held in
Oslo; Nayarit, Mexico; and Vienna). They also expressed the view that, in light of their
transboundary and potentially global impact, the risk posed by nuclear weapons was too high
and that the existence of nuclear weapons within a State does not increase but rather lowers the
protection and security of its population.
29. The Working Group considered that the best chance for reaching a world without nuclear
weapons would be through the involvement of all States that possess nuclear weapons.
30. A number of States noted the steps taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce the overall
number of nuclear weapons, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and to
extend the scope of their negative security assurances.
31. It was however noted by many States that such steps had resulted in only a partial reduction
in the role of nuclear weapons while still leaving intact a capacity to hold entire societies at risk.
Concerns were expressed regarding continued efforts by nuclear-weapon States towards the
qualitative improvement and modernization of their nuclear arsenals, as well as their continued
reliance on nuclear weapons. Concern was also expressed regarding the perceived weakening of
norms relating to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
32. Many States therefore emphasized the need to shift from a focus on reducing the role of
nuclear weapons to stigmatizing nuclear weapons, including by changing international and
public attitudes regarding policies and practices that are premised on the acceptance of such
weapons. This shift would be consistent with the humanitarian pledge issued at the Vienna
Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in December 2014 for the
prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, in which subscribing States committed to the
stigmatization, prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons in the light of their unacceptable
humanitarian consequences, environmental impact and other associated risks.
33. The Working Group affirmed that the development of any effective legal measures for
nuclear disarmament can only be aimed at strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and at implementing article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and that such measures should complement and strengthen the Treaty. In
addressing concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that would need to be
concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, many possible approaches
were considered.
34. A majority of States |1| expressed support for the commencement of negotiations in the
General Assembly in 2017, open to all States, international organizations and civil society, on a
legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination,
which would establish general prohibitions and obligations as well as a political commitment to
achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world. Representatives of civil society supported
this view.
35. Possible elements of such an instrument could include: (a) prohibitions on the acquisition,
possession, stockpiling, development, testing and production of nuclear weapons; (b)
prohibitions on participating in any use of nuclear weapons, including through participating in
nuclear war planning, participating in the targeting of nuclear weapons and training personnel to
take control of nuclear weapons; (c) prohibitions on permitting nuclear weapons in national
territory, including on permitting vessels with nuclear weapons in ports and territorial seas,
permitting aircraft with nuclear weapons from entering national airspace, permitting nuclear
weapons from being transited through national territory, permitting nuclear weapons from being
stationed or deployed on national territory; (d) prohibitions on financing nuclear weapon
activities or on providing special fissionable material to any states that do not apply International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards; (e) prohibitions on assisting,
encouraging or inducing, directly or indirectly, any activity prohibited by the treaty; and (f)
recognition of the rights of victims of the use and testing of nuclear weapons and a commitment
to provide assistance to victims and to environmental remediation. It was noted that the elements
and provisions to be included in such an instrument would be subject to its negotiation.
36. A legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons would be an interim or partial step
towards nuclear disarmament as it would not include measures for elimination and would instead
leave measures for the irreversible, verifiable and transparent destruction of nuclear weapons as
a matter for future negotiations. It would also contribute to the progressive stigmatization of
nuclear weapons. States supporting such an instrument considered it to be the most viable option
for immediate action as it would not need universal support for the commencement of
negotiations or for its entry into force. It was suggested, pursuant to the decision of the General
Assembly, in its resolution 68/32, to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level
international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in achieving the
objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in particular on the elements of a
comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.
37. Many States supported a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, which would set out
general obligations, prohibitions and practical arrangements for time-bound, irreversible and
verifiable nuclear disarmament. These States considered that the process for negotiating such a
convention and bringing negotiations to a conclusion should include a phased programme for the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. Such a convention
would constitute a non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable legal arrangement that
would give States assurances that nuclear weapons had been destroyed and that no new weapons
were being produced. It was noted that it would be technically difficult to negotiate detailed
provisions for the verified elimination of nuclear weapons without the involvement of States
possessing nuclear weapons. While many States supported the immediate commencement of
negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, it was noted that such a
convention could only be effective with the participation of the States possessing nuclear
weapons. Many of these States also supported the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to
prohibit nuclear weapons. It was also suggested, in this context, that the above-mentioned United
Nations high-level international conference to convene no later than 2018, pursuant to resolution
68/32, should review progress on those negotiations.
38. Some States described, as a possible option, a framework agreement, which would comprise
either a set of mutually reinforcing instruments dealing progressively with various aspects of the
nuclear disarmament process, or a chapeau agreement followed by subsidiary agreements or
protocols that would lead gradually to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Such an approach would
provide for flexibility, leave room for confidence-building measures and allow for a smooth
transition towards nuclear disarmament, simultaneously taking into account the concerns of all
States. It would not necessarily include a specific time frame for accomplishing the elimination
of nuclear weapons. It was proposed that a first subsidiary agreement or protocol that could be
negotiated might be a prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
39. Some States discussed a hybrid approach, which would include the immediate negotiation of
a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would be complemented by protocols
relating to national declarations, national implementation, verification and phases of destruction,
assistance and technical cooperation and a non-discriminatory verification regime to be
implemented following the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Proponents of this
approach considered that it would provide a framework for the progressive inclusion of all States
initially resistant to joining, thus reflecting the inclusiveness of the framework approach, while
providing for the same level of comprehensiveness and effectiveness as the nuclear weapons
convention.
40. A number of States |2| expressed support for a "progressive approach", focusing on the
importance of the existing global regime, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, which already contains treaty -level commitments on the goal of eliminating
all nuclear weapons. Within the framework of the Treaty, both non-nuclear-weapon States and
nuclear-weapon States needed to work together on the building blocks of the non-proliferation
architecture, consisting of parallel and simultaneous effective legal and non-legal measures
which can be of a multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral nature, and which are mutually
reinforcing. An important landmark would be a "minimization point", at which the number of
weapons would be reduced to a very low amount and an internationally reliable verification
regime with effective verification techniques and methods would be established. These States
considered that when "global zero" comes within reach, additional legal measures would then be
needed to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. At that point, it would be
necessary to consider how a non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable nuclear
disarmament framework, such as a multilateral nuclear weapons convention or a plurilateral
arrangement among those with nuclear weapons, would be drawn up as the final building block.
They considered that significant work remained ahead before this point could be attained. The
view was expressed that many measures proposed under the progressive approach reflected
existing commitments that enjoyed consensus.
41. States supporting the progressive approach supported the following as effective legal
measures: (a) achieving the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty; (b) negotiating a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) commencing
negotiations on a post-New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation; (d) achieving universal adherence to the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; (e) promoting full
implementation of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material; (f) providing support for the practical implementation of Security Council resolution
1540 (2004); (g) strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones and creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones and weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zones; and (h) supporting and strengthening
the IAEA safeguards system. A full list of the legal and non-legal measures proposed under the
progressive approach appears in annex I to the present report.
42. Another approach discussed was the idea of an additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which could be negotiated as a separate instrument. Such an
approach would keep nuclear disarmament as an integral part of the Treaty.
43. The Working Group also discussed criteria for evaluating the feasibility and effectiveness of
the various approaches for nuclear disarmament. Under each approach, some States suggested
that criteria could include scope and content, required membership, normative value, political
viability, maturity and potential to contribute to achieving and maintaining a world without
nuclear weapons. Some States also expressed the view that the only criterion that should be
considered was scope of the adopted approach. It was further noted by some States that the
various approaches were partially overlapping, not necessarily mutually exclusive and could
make different contributions to nuclear disarmament.
44. While different approaches would entail different types of legal instruments or sets of
instruments, many elements were suggested that could form part of such legal instruments. In
this regard, many States suggested that these could include core elements, linked directly to the
prohibition of nuclear weapons, other elements associated with the elimination of nuclear
weapons, including those related to fissile material, and verification, as well as elements linked
to other objectives such as victim assistance, some of which have already been mentioned above.
Without prejudice to any future elaboration of effective legal measures, a list of suggested
elements appears in annex II to the present report.
45. It was noted that many of these elements coincide with obligations undertaken by some
States pursuant to their existing treaty-based commitments, including through the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.
Certain provisions were considered to be analogous with basic obligations contained within the
Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some measures could
only be pursued and implemented with the engagement and cooperation of the States possessing
nuclear weapons. Many States considered that the pursuit of many other measures and
provisions could benefit both disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, even if pursued
exclusively by non-nuclear-weapon States.
46. It was noted that there is more than one way in which nuclear disarmament can be achieved.
Various possible elements and provisions could be pursued under each of the various approaches
and many could be pursued across more than one. It was noted that possible elements and
provisions vary in their connection to the process of disarmament and in their potential impact
on efforts to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. It was also noted that
certain measures vary in their applicability to all States, nuclear-armed States, non-nuclear-armed States and other States that continue to maintain a role for nuclear weapons in their
security doctrines.
47. The Working Group considered other measures that could contribute to taking forward
multilateral disarmament negotiations. Transparency, risk reduction and awareness-raising are
important to the achievement of the verifiability and irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.
Transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons
48. The Working Group underscored the principle of transparency, along with the principles of
irreversibility and verifiability, which it deemed crucial to the process of nuclear disarmament.
Without transparency, nuclear disarmament cannot be credibly verified, nor would States have
adequate confidence that nuclear disarmament measures have been accomplished in an
irreversible manner. Increased transparency also alleviates mistrust among States and builds
confidence and trust at regional and international levels.
49. The Working Group stressed the importance of ensuring access to information reported by
the States possessing nuclear weapons to the public and to neighbouring and other States. In this
connection, many States supported the establishment of a reporting mechanism within the
framework of the United Nations with a view to enhancing accountability and facilitating
nuclear disarmament.
50. With respect to the public disclosure of information related to nuclear weapon programmes
and activities, the need to protect sensitive information from malicious use by terrorists,
criminals and non-State actors was underscored.
51. Various transparency measures were suggested by different States related to the risks
associated with existing nuclear weapons, including that States possessing nuclear weapons
should provide standardized information at regular intervals on, inter alia:
(a) The number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed,
and the alert status) of nuclear warheads within their territories as well as those deployed
in the territories of other countries;
(b) The number and the type of delivery vehicles;
(c) The measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military
and security concepts, doctrines and policies;
(d) The measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use
of nuclear weapons;
(e) The measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon
systems;
(f) The number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part
of nuclear disarmament efforts;
(g) The amount of fissile material produced for military purposes: the Working Group
considered that baseline information on these issues would also contribute to verification
and nuclear disarmament negotiations;
(h) Information about plans, expenditures and number of facilities related to the
modernization of nuclear weapons.
52. The above standardized information should be provided to the Secretary-General, who
should make such information available to Member States and to the public.
53. Many States also suggested that other States that maintain a role for nuclear weapons in their
military and security concepts, doctrines and policies be encouraged to also provide standardized
information at regular intervals on, inter alia:
(a) The number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed,
and the alert status) of nuclear warheads within their territories;
(b) The number and the type of delivery vehicles within their territories;
(c) The measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military
and security concepts, doctrines and policies.
Measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or
intentional nuclear weapon detonations
54. The Working Group considered that the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or
intentional nuclear weapon detonations would persist for as long as nuclear weapons exist. The
only way to eliminate this risk is by achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
55. The Working Group discussed a number of factors that could contribute to the current and
growing risk of a nuclear weapon detonation. These factors include: increasing tensions
involving nuclear-armed and other States at the international and regional levels; the
vulnerability of nuclear-weapon command and control systems and early warning networks to
cyberattacks and attacks by non-State actors; and the growing automation of weapon systems. At
the same time, it was acknowledged that the precise nature of the risks was difficult to assess
given the lack of transparency in nuclear weapon programmes.
56. Many States expressed particular concern that the maintenance of nuclear weapons at high
alert levels could significantly multiply the risks and the threat posed by nuclear weapons and
negatively affect the process of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, they considered that
measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems would increase human and
international security and represent an interim step towards nuclear disarmament as well as an
effective measure to mitigate some of the risks associated with nuclear weapons.
57. While the Working Group expressed support for the implementation of measures to reduce
risks and increase safety, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it was emphasized
that this does not imply support for any possession or use of nuclear weapons.
58. Various measures were suggested by different States to reduce the risk of accidental,
mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations, pending the total elimination
of nuclear weapons, including that States possessing nuclear weapons and other relevant States
should undertake further practical measures to:
(a) Reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons;
(b) Reduce the number of non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons;
(c) Reduce nuclear weapons designated as surplus stockpiles;
(d) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction of the global stockpile of any type of
nuclear weapons;
(e) Reduce risks associated with nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, in particular nuclear-armed cruise missiles, including actions to limit, prevent deployment of and lead to a ban
on all nuclear-armed cruise missiles;
(f) Commit to reduce, or at least freeze, the number of nuclear weapons in holding
pending the commencement and conclusion of plurilateral negotiations on nuclear
weapons reductions;
(g) Reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and the value assigned to the
role of nuclear weapons in military training schools;
(h) Develop and implement nuclear weapons policies that reduce and eliminate any
dependence on early launch or launch-on-warning postures and refrain from increasing
the alert levels of their nuclear forces;
(i) Conclude agreements to eliminate launch-on-warning from their operational settings
and carry out a phased stand-down of high-alert strategic forces;
(j) Begin developing a long-term formal agreement to lower the alert level for the use of
nuclear weapons, with all agreed steps to be measurable and carried out within an agreed
time frame;
(k) Increase the safety and security of nuclear weapon stockpiles;
(l) Ensure the protection of nuclear-weapon command and control systems from
cyberthreats;
(m) Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, refrain
from the development and use of new nuclear weapon technologies and any action that
would undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty and maintain all existing
moratoriums on nuclear-weapon-test explosions;
(n) Pending negotiations and the entry into force of a treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, maintain and
declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes;
(o) Dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities for the production of fissile material
for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(p) Respect fully their commitments with regard to security assurances, extend such
assurances if they have not yet done so and withdraw reservations and interpretative
statements on the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones;
(q) Be more transparent regarding accidents involving nuclear weapons and on the steps
taken in response to these accidents.
Additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of and
interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result
from any nuclear detonation
59. The Working Group emphasized the importance of promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education, including on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear
weapons in all States, especially in States that possess nuclear weapons. The Working Group
recalled that the overall objective of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training is
to impart knowledge and skills to individuals in order to empower them to make their
contributions, as national and world citizens, to the achievement of concrete disarmament and
non-proliferation measures and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under
effective international control.
60. The Working Group recognized the respective roles that Member States, the United Nations
system, international organizations and civil society, including non-governmental organizations,
academia, parliamentarians, the mass media and individuals, can play in enhancing public
awareness about the threat of nuclear weapons, its impact on, inter alia, health and gender,
sustainable development, climate change and environment, the protection of cultural heritage
and human rights.
61. The Working Group also stressed the importance of engaging young people, including
through the promotion of special youth communicators and student peace ambassadors, in order
to pass on knowledge to future generations.
62. Many States considered that raising public awareness on the humanitarian impact of nuclear
weapons is important in conveying the facts regarding the risks of a nuclear weapon detonation
to a broader audience and in creating thereby an informed citizenry.
63. Various measures were suggested by different States, including measures that all States
could take to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship
between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from any nuclear
detonation:
(a) Disarmament and non-proliferation education:
(i) Promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, including on the
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in all States, especially in States
that possess nuclear weapons;
(ii) Promote education and training on peace, disarmament, non-proliferation and
international law, including international humanitarian law, as part of school and
university curricula, with the objective of fostering critical thinking skills among
youth;
(iii) Include information on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as
well as on the consequences of nuclear testing, including in the South Pacific and
elsewhere, in history textbooks;
(iv) Encourage the employment of simulation and role-playing techniques, which
can promote mutual understanding of security concerns and threat perceptions;
(v) Encourage training in the use of open-source tools and technologies, such as
geospatial imaging, 3D modelling and big data analysis as a means of promoting
societal verification;
(vi) Identify national disarmament and non-proliferation education focal points as
a means of facilitating reporting on the implementation of the recommendations
of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education
(A/57/124);
(vii) Support the establishment of youth peace ambassadors to share messages in
national and international forums in favour of peace and a world without nuclear
weapons;
(b) Understanding of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons:
(i) Promote efforts to raise awareness at the grass -roots level about the
consequences of the use of nuclear weapons across national borders and
generations, including on interconnected issues such as sustainable development,
the environment, climate change, the protection of cultural heritage, human
rights, humanitarian action, children's rights, public health and gender;
(ii) Ensure greater emphasis on the unique impact of nuclear weapons on the
health of women and girls;
(iii) Support the designation of atomic bomb survivors as special messengers for a
world without nuclear weapons;
(iv) Support efforts to raise awareness of the legacy of nuclear testing around the
world, including through the commemoration of 29 August as the International
Day against Nuclear Tests, translating the stories of nuclear test victims and
encouraging visits to former nuclear test sites;
(v) Support the translation of the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors into
multiple languages;
(vi) Encourage world leaders, decision-makers, diplomats and academics to visit
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to experience first-hand the impact of nuclear
weapons and to interact with survivors;
(vii) Consider convening additional international conferences on the humanitarian
impact of nuclear weapons;
(viii) Support additional research and studies about risks and the long-term
consequences associated with nuclear weapons;
(ix) Conduct outreach through all forms of media, including conventional media,
such as television, radio and printed materials, as well as social media;
(x) Integrate nuclear disarmament with policymaking, including at the highest
levels of global governance, in all other areas which have a global impact such as
sustainable development, climate change, food security, cyberterrorism, human
rights or gender considerations;
(xi) Make use of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons on 26 September as a means to enhance public awareness about the
threat of nuclear weapons, including the humanitarian consequences of any
nuclear weapon detonation.
Other measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations
64. The Working Group also considered further measures that could contribute to taking forward
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. These included the need for the prompt and
effective implementation in good faith of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision adopted at the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", the practical
steps for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as
well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, including through concrete benchmarks
and timelines.
65. Further to the implementation of past commitments, the following measures were also
suggested by different States to contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations:
(a) Return immediately to substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament through
the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, including
negotiations on the four core items of its agenda, including nuclear disarmament, a treaty
banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices on the basis of the report submitted to the Conference in 1995
(CD/1299), the prevention of an arms race in outer space and effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons. A view was expressed that, if the Conference does not commence
negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials, States may consider
commencing negotiations outside the Conference. The view was also expressed that the
Conference should resume discussions on its membership;
(b) Facilitate further major reductions in nuclear arsenals, including efforts to reduce
levels of hostility and tension between States – particularly between those possessing
nuclear weapons: confidence-building measures play an important role in this regard;
(c) Support efforts to further develop human and technical capacity in order to improve
the capability to detect nuclear explosions, in accordance with the resolution establishing
the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBT/MSS/RES/1);
(d) Strengthen nuclear-weapon-free zones and establish new ones, including, as a
priority, in the Middle East, including through the implementation of the resolution
adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the Middle East;
(e) Cease all efforts to upgrade and modernize existing nuclear weapons in ways that
result in new military capabilities or enable new military missions;
(f) Support measures to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium on a voluntary
basis and to use low enriched uranium where technically and economically feasible;
(g) Assess the international legal obligations under international humanitarian law,
international human rights law and international environmental law in the context of the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
(h) Assess further the ethical dimensions of nuclear weapons in debates and conferences.
66. The Open-ended Working Group recommended that additional efforts can and should be
pursued to elaborate concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need
to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. The Working Group
reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the
commitments made therein and further considered that the pursuit of any such measures,
provisions and norms should complement and strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including the three pillars of the Treaty.
67. The Working Group recommended, with widespread support, |3| the convening, by the General
Assembly, of a conference in 2017, open to all States, with the participation and contribution of
international organizations and civil society, to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit
nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, as outlined in paragraph 34 above. The
Working Group recognized that other States |4| did not agree with the above recommendation and
that they had recommended that any process to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations must address national, international and collective security concerns and supported
the pursuit of practical steps, consisting of parallel and simultaneous effective legal and non-legal measures to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, as outlined in
paragraphs 40 and 41, for which there was no agreement. The Working Group further recognized
the views expressed with regard to other approaches.
68. The Working Group also recommended that States should consider implementing, as
appropriate, the various measures suggested in the present report that could contribute to taking
forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including but not limited to: transparency
measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons; measures to reduce and
eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon
detonations; additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of
and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result
from any nuclear detonation; as well as other measures that could contribute to taking forward
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.
69. At its meetings held on 16, 17 and 19 August 2016, the Working Group considered item 6,
entitled "Report to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session".
70. Following a request for a vote on the draft report as contained in A/AC.286/CRP.3, oral
amendments were proposed to paragraph 67, by replacing the words "recognized that there was a
recommendation which received" in the first sentence with the words "recommended with", as
well as the deletion of the word "also" in the beginning of the second sentence after the words
"The Working Group". The Working Group decided to adopt the proposed oral amendments by a
non-recorded vote with 62 in favour, 27 against and 8 abstentions.
71. At its final meeting, on 19 August, the Working Group adopted its report as contained in
documents A/AC.286/L.1, A/AC.286/CRP.2 and A/AC.286/CRP.3, as orally amended, by a non-recorded vote, with 68 in favour, 22 against and 13 abstentions. Statements were made in an
explanation of vote.
Measures proposed under the progressive approach*
1. Effective measures proposed under the progressive approach included:
(a) Achieving the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
(b) Negotiating a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(c) Commencing negotiations on a post-New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
between the United States of America and the Russian Federation;
(d) Achieving universal adherence to the International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;
(e) Promoting full implementation of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
(f) Providing support for the practical implementation of Security Council resolution
1540 (2004);
(g) Strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones and creating new nuclear-weapon-free
zones and weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zones;
(h) Supporting and strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards system;
(i) Promoting the implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct and contributing to its
universal adoption;
(j) Helping to create conditions that would facilitate further major reductions in nuclear
arsenals, including confidence-building measures and efforts to reduce levels of hostility
and tension between States – particularly among those possessing nuclear weapons.
2. States possessing nuclear weapons, while taking into account relevant security considerations,
should also take the following practical concrete measures:
(a) Increasing transparency measures in relation to their nuclear arsenals and fissile
material holdings;
(b) Dismantling or converting for peaceful uses facilities for the production of fissile
material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(c) Pending negotiations and the entry into force of a treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive nuclear devices,
maintaining and declaring moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons purposes;
(d) Designating fissile material no longer required for military purposes and the
development of legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to
ensure the irreversible removal of such fissile material;
(e) Reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons through
further practical measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in
ways that promote international stability and security;
(f) Reducing the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons;
(g) Reducing the number of non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons;
(h) Reducing, or at least freezing, the number of nuclear weapons in holding pending the
commencement and conclusion of plurilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons
reductions;
(i) Continuing to respect fully their commitments with regard to security assurances or to
extend such assurances if they have not yet done so;
(j) Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,
maintaining and declaring moratoriums on nuclear weapons tests, as well as restraining
from the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat
the object and purpose of that Treaty.
3. States should further commit to the following additional measures:
(a) Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines;
(b) Promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising,
including on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, as
appropriate;
(c) Continuing work on developing verification capabilities, including through the
International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification;
(d) An immediate return to substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament.
* No agreement was reached on annex I.
Suggested elements for effective legal measures that could be included in an international
legal instrument*
| Element |
Details |
| 1. General
obligations and
prohibitions |
Prohibitions on the development, testing, including subcritical
experiments and supercomputer simulations, production, acquisition,
possession, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear
weapons, as well as on the production of weapons-usable fissile
material |
| 2. Definition of
nuclear weapons |
The definition of a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of
releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a
group of characteristics that is appropriate for use for warlike
purposes: an instrument that may be used for the transport or
propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is
separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof |
| 3. Prohibitions
relating to the use or
threat of use of
nuclear weapons |
Prohibitions on participating in any use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons
Prohibition on participating in nuclear war planning
Prohibition on participating in the targeting of nuclear weapons
Prohibition on training personnel to take control of and use another
State's nuclear weapons |
| 4. Prohibition on
development and
production |
Adoption of measures to prevent the use of new technologies for
upgrading existing nuclear-weapon systems, including the prohibition
of nuclear-weapon research and development
Cessation by the nuclear-weapon States of the development and
qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their means of
delivery and related infrastructure
Prohibition on the development of nuclear weapons and delivery
systems could preclude nuclear research and research on the testing of
nuclear weapons, including subcritical and other means of testing
Prohibition from participating financially or otherwise in the
production of nuclear weapons
Addressing issues related to dual-use technology, without prejudice to
the inalienable rights of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy |
| 5. Deployment |
Prohibitions on accepting any stationing, installation or deployment
of nuclear weapons |
| 6. Visitation, transit,
overflight, stationing
and deployment |
Prohibitions on permitting nuclear weapons in national territory,
including on permitting vessels with nuclear weapons in ports and
territorial seas, permitting aircraft with nuclear weapons from
entering national airspace, permitting nuclear weapons from being
transited through national territory and permitting nuclear weapons
from being stationed or deployed on national territory |
| 7. Nuclear material |
Prohibition of the production of any fissionable material which can be
used directly to make a nuclear weapon, including separated
plutonium and highly enriched uranium: low enriched uranium would
be permitted for peaceful purposes
Placement of all existing fissile material under international
safeguards
Dismantlement or conversion for peaceful use of facilities for the
production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices
Designation of fissile material which is no longer required for
military purposes
Development of legally binding verification arrangements, within the
context of IAEA |
| 8. Financing and
supply of fissile
materials |
Prohibitions on financing nuclear weapon activities, including any
support to private entities involved in nuclear weapon activities,
except those activities necessary for the implementation of the treaty
and in meeting stockpile elimination obligations or on providing
special fissionable material to any States that do not apply IAEA
comprehensive safeguards |
| 9. Assistance,
encouragement and
inducement in
prohibited acts |
Prohibitions on assisting, encouraging or inducing, directly or
indirectly, any activity prohibited by the treaty |
| 10. Victims and the
environment |
Recognition of the rights of victims of the use and testing of nuclear
weapons and a commitment to provide assistance to victims and to
environmental remediation |
| 11. Declarations |
Declarations of the existence in their arsenals and stockpiles of all
nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear facilities and nuclear
weapon delivery vehicles they possess or control and their locations |
| 12. Phases for
elimination |
A specific sequence of phases for the elimination of nuclear weapons
were identified: (a) taking nuclear weapons off alert; (b) removing
weapons from deployment; (c) removing nuclear warheads from their
delivery vehicles; (d) removing and disfiguring the "pits"; and (e)
placing the fissile material under international control
Obligations to eliminate nuclear arsenals within an agreed time frame
and in a specified manner could be included |
| 13. Verification |
Verification arrangements, including routine and challenge
inspections, as well as measures for the use of on-site sensors,
satellite photography, radionuclide sampling and other remote
sensors, information sharing with other organizations and citizen
reporting
Establishment of an international monitoring system and making
information available through a registry |
| 14. Rights and
obligations of
individuals |
Rights and obligations for individuals, including national legislation
to criminalize support for activities proscribed under the convention
and protections for individuals reporting such activities, including the
right of asylum |
| 15. Compliance and
secretariat |
Establishment of an international agency responsible for verification
and ensuring compliance, comprising a conference of States parties,
an executive council and a technical secretariat, or giving IAEA an
active role in verifying nuclear disarmament
The secretariat shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or
extraordinary consultations among Member States on matters relating
to the purposes, measures and procedures set out in the instrument |
| 16. Dispute
settlement |
Dispute settlement, including provisions for consultation,
cooperation, fact-finding and other measures to clarify and resolve
implementation issues, including the possibility of referring a dispute
to the International Court of Justice and, if required, referring a
situation to the Security Council
Provision of a series of graduated responses for non-compliance and,
if required, sanctions or recourse to the General Assembly and the
Security Council for action |
| 17. National
implementation
measures |
Requirement for States parties to adopt necessary legislative measures
to implement their obligations under the convention and to establish a
national authority responsible for national implementation |
| 18. Optional protocol
concerning energy
assistance |
Nothing should affect the inalienable right of all the parties to any
instrument to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
their relevant international obligations: an optional protocol
establishing a programme of energy assistance could be included |
| 19. Cooperation and
assistance to meet the
obligations of the
treaty |
Provision of a framework for international cooperation and technical
assistance to work towards meeting obligations |
| 20. Relation with
other international
agreements |
Possibility of adding functions and activities of existing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and verification and
compliance arrangements, as well as establishing additional
complementary arrangements |
| 21. Military
cooperation |
Requirement not to participate in any act prohibited and in doctrines
based on nuclear deterrence, and ensuring that participation in an
alliance with a nuclear-armed State is compatible with the
commitments and policies under the instruments |
* No agreement was reached on annex II.
List of documents submitted by the Chair, Member States, international organizations,
institutions and non-governmental organizations
| Symbol |
Title |
| A/AC.286/1 |
Provisional agenda: submitted by the Chair-designate |
| A/AC.286/2 |
Synthesis paper: submitted by the Chair |
| A/AC.286/WP.1/Rev.1 |
Revised indicative timetable: submitted by the Chair-designate |
| A/AC.286/WP.2/Rev.1 |
Panel I on substantively addressing concrete effective legal measures,
legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and
maintain a world without nuclear weapons: submitted by the Chair-designate |
| A/AC.286/WP.3/Rev.1 |
Panel II on substantively addressing recommendations on other
measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiations, including but not limited to: (a)
transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing
nuclear weapons; (b) measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of
accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon
detonations; and (c) additional measures to increase awareness and
understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the
wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from any
nuclear detonation: submitted by the Chair-designate |
| A/AC.286/WP.4 |
Nuclear weapons and security: A humanitarian perspective: submitted
by Austria |
| A/AC.286/WP.5 |
The "legal gap", the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and different approaches on taking forward nuclear
disarmament negotiations: submitted by Austria |
| A/AC.286/WP.6/Rev.1 |
Position paper on nuclear disarmament by the Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States: submitted by the Dominican Republic
in its capacity as President pro tempore of the Community |
| A/AC.286/WP.7 |
Views and recommendations with regard to issues related to taking
forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations: submitted by
the Islamic Republic of Iran |
| A/AC.286/WP.8 |
Empirical analysis of pathways for taking forward multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiation: submitted by Costa Rica and Malaysia |
| A/AC.286/WP.9/Rev.2 |
A progressive approach to a world free of nuclear weapons: revisiting
the building blocks paradigm: submitted by Australia, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and
Turkey |
| A/AC.286/WP.10 |
Consolidated answers to the guiding questions submitted by Panel I on
substantively addressing concrete effective legal measures, legal
provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and
maintain a world without nuclear weapons: submitted by Brazil |
| A/AC.286/WP. 11 |
Model nuclear weapons convention: submitted by Costa Rica and
Malaysia |
| A/AC.286/WP.12 |5| |
Propuesta de acciones practicas para lograr el desarme nuclear:
presentado por Cuba |
| A/AC.286/WP.13 |
Developing and strengthening norms for attaining and maintaining a
world without nuclear weapons: submitted by Costa Rica and Malaysia |
| A/AC.286/WP.14 |
Elements for a treaty banning nuclear weapons: submitted by Fiji,
Nauru, Palau, Samoa and Tuvalu |
| A/AC.286/WP.15 |
Proposal by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean states
on effective legal measures to attain and maintain a world without
nuclear weapons: submitted by the Dominican Republic in its capacity
of President pro tempore of the Community |
| A/AC.286/WP.16 |
The existence of a legal gap: submitted by the Netherlands |
| A/AC.286/WP.17 |
A legally binding instrument that will need to be concluded to attain
and maintain a world without nuclear weapons: a prohibition on
nuclear weapons: submitted by Mexico |
| A/AC.286/WP.18 |
De-alerting: submitted by Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zealand,
Sweden and Switzerland (the De-alerting Group) |
| A/AC.286/WP.19 |
Measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken,
unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations: submitted by
Iraq |
| A/AC.286/WP.20/Rev.1 |
Is there a "Legal Gap for the elimination and prohibition of nuclear
weapons"?: submitted by Canada |
| A/AC.286/WP.21/Rev.1 |
Revised indicative timetable – 2 to 13 May 2016: submitted by the
Chair |
| A/AC.286/WP.22 |
Effective measures towards a world free of nuclear weapons:
submitted by Japan |
| A/AC.286/WP.23 |
Issues and challenges in actual reduction and elimination of nuclear
weapons: submitted by Japan |
| A/AC.286/WP.24 |
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: effective measures to
facilitate establishing the norm against nuclear testing: submitted by
Japan and Kazakhstan |
| A/AC.286/WP.25/Rev.1 |
The road to zero: the progressive approach: submitted by Belgium,
Canada, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland and the Republic
of Korea |
| A/AC.286/WP.26/Rev.1 |
Security assurances: submitted by Belgium, Canada, Germany,
Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden |
| A/AC.286/WP.27/Rev. 1* |
La prohibicion de las armas nucleares: preguntas relacionadas con su
ambito de aplicacion y cumplimento: presentado por Nicaragua |
| A/AC.286/WP.28 |
Panel I on measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental,
mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations:
submitted by the Chair |
| A/AC.286/WP.29 |
Panel II on transparency measures related to the risks associated with
existing nuclear weapons: submitted by the Chair |
| A/AC.286/WP.30 |
Panel III on additional measures to increase awareness and
understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the
wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from any
nuclear detonation: submitted by the Chair |
| A/AC.286/WP.31 |
Panel IV on essential elements that could form part of effective legal
measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to
attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons: submitted by the
Chair |
| A/AC.286/WP.32 |
Panel V on possible pathways to take forward multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiations: submitted by the Chair |
| A/AC.286/WP.33 |
Panel VI on other measures that could contribute to taking forward
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations: submitted by the Chair |
| A/AC.286/WP.34/Rev.1 |
Addressing nuclear disarmament: recommendations from the
perspective of nuclear-weapon-free zones: submitted by Argentina,
Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico
and Zambia |
| A/AC.286/WP.35 |
Nuclear disarmament in context submitted by Ireland a global
governance issue: |
| A/AC.286/WP.36 |
The "legal gap": recommendations to the Open-ended Working Group
on taking forward nuclear disarmament negotiations: submitted by
Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin,
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands,
Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq,
Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall
Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino,
Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe and State of Palestine |
| A/AC.286/WP.37 |
Effective measures, legal norms and provisions on nuclear weapons: a
hybrid approach towards nuclear disarmament: submitted by Brazil |
| A/AC.286/WP.38/Rev.1 |
Imperatives for arms control and disarmament: submitted by Australia,
Canada, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Republic of
Korea, Slovakia and Spain |
| A/AC.286/WP.39 |
Nuclear armed cruise missiles: submitted by Sweden and Switzerland |
| A/AC.286/WP.40 |
Treaty of Tlatelolco: a disarmament instrument: submitted by
Argentina in its capacity as coordinator of the Agency for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| A/AC.286/NGO/1 |
Taking control: how non-nuclear-weapon States can take forward
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations: submitted by Wildfire |
| A/AC.286/NGO/2 |
Filling the legal gap for the prohibition of nuclear weapons: submitted
by Article 36 and the Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom |
| A/AC.286/NGO/3 |
A treaty banning nuclear weapons: submitted by Article 36 and the
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom |
| A/AC.286/NGO/4 |
The role of nuclear alliance States in taking forward multilateral
nuclear disarmament negotiations: submitted by Wildfire |
| A/AC.286/NGO/5 |
Quest of legal measures with specificity and feasibility for nuclear
disarmament: submitted by Peace Depot Inc. |
| A/AC.286/NGO/6 |
Obligation and opportunity: negotiations in good faith: submitted by
the World Council of Churches |
| A/AC.286/NGO/7 |
Building the framework for a nuclear-weapon-free world: submitted by
the Basel Peace Office |
| A/AC.286/NGO/8 |
Increasing transparency, reducing risk and raising awareness: the role
of non-nuclear-weapon States: submitted by Grupo de Práticas em
Direitos Humanos e Direito Internacional |
| A/AC.286/NGO/9 |
Open letter: submitted by Mayors for Peace |
| A/AC.286/NGO/10 |
Towards a United Nations agency that will include the mandate to
educate the global public on the treaty banning nuclear weapons:
submitted by Center for Peace Education, Miriam College, the
Philippines |
| A/AC.286/NGO/11/Rev. 1 |
Respond realistically to the critical moment: submitted by the Global
Security Institute |
| A/AC.286/NGO/12 |
A legal instrument for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear
weapons: submitted by the International Association of Lawyers
Against Nuclear Arms |
| A/AC.286/NGO/13 |
Nuclear risks: submitted by the People for Nuclear Disarmament/
Human Survival Project |
| A/AC.286/NGO/14 |
Closing our wallets to nuclear weapons: the necessity of including
explicit language on financing in a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty
or framework of agreements: submitted by PAX |
| A/AC.286/NGO/15 |
Measures for States relying on, but not possessing nuclear weapons, to
take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations: submitted
by PAX |
| A/AC.286/NGO/16 |
Different elements for the interoperability and nuclear ban discussion:
submitted by the Human Security Network in Latin America and the
Caribbean Region |
| A/AC.286/NGO/17/Rev.1 |
Nuclear weapons and human security: submitted by Soka Gakkai
International |
| A/AC.286/NGO/18 |
The health and humanitarian case for banning and eliminating nuclear
weapons: submitted by the International Council of Nurses, the
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the World
Federation of Public Health Associations and the World Medical
Association |
| A/AC.286/NGO/19 |
Progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament requires a treaty
prohibiting the possession, threat or use of nuclear weapons: submitted
by Los Alamos Study Group |
| A/AC.286/NGO/20 |
Options for a framework agreement: submitted by the Middle Powers
Initiative |
| A/AC.286/NGO/21 |
Nuclear disarmament summits: building political traction for the
adoption and implementation of legal measures and norms: submitted
by Middle Powers Initiative |
| A/AC.286/NGO/22/Rev. 1 |
Security and humanitarian implications of relying on nuclear weapons
for deterrence, and effective alternatives: submitted by Acronym
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy |
| A/AC.286/NGO/23 |
Options for moving forward on disarmament: submitted by the Arms
Control Association |
| A/AC.286/NGO/24 |
Three measures to contribute to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world: submitted by the group of non-governmental experts from
countries belonging to the New Agenda Coalition |
| A/AC.286/NGO/25 |
The contribution of domestic policies to advancing multilateral nuclear
disarmament: submitted by the World Future Council |
| A/AC.286/NGO/26 |
Youth: a necessary stakeholder in nuclear disarmament processes:
submitted by Amplify – generation of change |
| A/AC.286/NGO/27 |
Measures to confront growing risks of catastrophic nuclear weapons
use: submitted by Global Zero |
| A/AC.286/NGO/28 |
The right to survive, the right for peoples to determine their own
survival, and the referendum as a means of abolishing nuclear
weapons: submitted by Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement
Nucléaire |
| A/AC.286/NGO/29 |
Open letter to support the work of the Open-ended working group:
submitted by Mayors for Peace |
| A/AC.286/NGO/30/Rev. 1 |
Building the framework for a nuclear-weapon-free world: submitted by
the Basel Peace Office |
| A/AC.286/NGO/31 |
Échapper au double jeu du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes
nucléaires : présenté par l'Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement
Nucléaire* |
| A/AC.286/MISC.
1/Rev. 1 |
Disarmament and non-proliferation education: submitted by the James
Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies |
| A/AC.286/MISC.2 |
Accelerating global nuclear disarmament: a menu of 16 policy options:
submitted by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
"Clingendael" |
| A/AC.286/MISC.3 |
Non-nuclear-weapon States and a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons:
submitted by the Institute of International Studies, Universitas Gadjah
Mada |
| A/AC.286/L. 1 |
Draft report of the Open-ended Working Group taking forward
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations |
Notes:
* A/71/150. [Back]
1. Comprising, inter alia, members of the African Group (54 States), the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (10 States) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (33 States), as well as a number of
States from Asia and the Pacific and Europe. [Back]
2. Comprising, inter alia, the 24 States advocating the progressive approach. [Back]
3. States supporting this recommendation comprise, inter alia, members of the African Group (54 States), the
Association of South East Asian Nations (10 States) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(33 States), as well as a number of States from Asia and the Pacific and Europe. [Back]
4. States supporting this recommendation comprise, inter alia, the 24 States advocating the progressive
approach. [Back]
5. Unofficial English translation made available after the issuance of the original text. [Back]
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