flagrant breach"
of the Versailles provisions relating to a demilitarized zone, providing "such breach constitutes
an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the
demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary"... |83| (Underlining added.) No explanation of
what facts would signify that the action was either "flagrant", "unprovoked" or "aggression" was
offered.
Resort to war would also be permissible if it was done pursuant to Art. 16 of the Covenant, or
a decision taken by the Assembly or the Council under Art. 15, but in the latter case only if it was
directed against "a state which was the first to attack". |84|
Differences were to be settled by peaceful means and conflicts were to be submitted to judicial
decision which the parties agreed to accept. Other problems would go to a newly created
Conciliation Commission, and if the Commission's proposals or other arbitral or judicial decisions,
were not accepted the question would go to the Council of the League to be dealt within the limits
prescribed by the Covenant. |85|
During the Locarno meetings no one paid much attention to the question of trying to define
aggression, or of trying to pin down precisely what was meant by "flagrant", "unprovoked", or
some of the other vague terms in the Treaty. The defects were concealed by an event which
occurred within 10 days after the Locarno meetings were concluded and which was to raise public
hopes that a procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes had finally been devised.
A border incident occurred between Greece and Bulgaria, both Members of the League, which
caused the Secretary General of the League to convene the Council to deal with a threat of war.
The British, French and Italians joined to put an end to the hostilities. There was an immediate
cease-fire, withdrawal from occupied territories, appointment of a commission to investigate and
report to the Council, and agreement by both parties to be bound by the Council's decision. The
Council found that the pleas of both sides that they had acted in self defense were unjustified, that
responsibility was divided and that some reparations should be paid by Greece. This success,
coupled with the new treaties signed at Locarno, seemed to confirm the impression that the
Covenant could work effectively without any more detailed agreements than those already
concluded.
The Locarno Treaty went into force in September 1926. Under the illusion that nothing more was
required, attention was directed during the next few years to additional bilateral or multi-lateral
security arrangements.
With the states on her western flank forming alliances the Soviet Union began to look to her own
defenses. In 1925 she signed a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with Turkey, in which the
parties agreed to refrain from aggression, to form no alliances with others, and to refrain from any
hostile act in the event of hostilities with third parties. |86| The following year Russia went a step
further, and in her Treaty of Non-Aggression with Lithuania the parties also agreed to a
conciliation commission to resolve differences which might arise between them. |87| A year after
that in its Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality with Persia the Soviets were to go even further, and
prohibit acts of subversion or the organization of any groups directed against the government of
the other party. |88|
The major powers, the United States, Germany and Russia, were outside the League and yet no
effective decisions regarding world peace could be concluded without them. 1926 was a year
which concentrated on the problems connected with the admission of Germany into the League
and the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty. The Senate of the United States had made it clear
that although it would authorize U.S. signature to the statute for the World Court, it would be
subject to the reservation that "such adherance shall not be taken to involve any legal relation on
the part of the United States to the League of Nations"'.... The Court could only act on matters
affecting the United States if the United States agreed, and even this restricted adherence to the
Court could not be construed to "require the United States to depart from its traditional policy
of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or
internal administration of any foreign state" or "to imply a relinquishment by the United States of
its traditional attitude toward purely American questions". |89| It was within the framework of the
planned Disarmament Conference that more effective cooperation was to be sought.
(b) The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and Model Treaties of
Non-Aggression (1926-1928)
The United States, Germany and the Soviet Union, although not Members of the League, played
an active role in the preparations for the Disarmament Conference foreseen by the Versailles
Treaty and the Covenant. The Commission to prepare the conference appointed a Committee on
Arbitration and Security which was to consider the entire question of reducing the need for
armaments by providing alternate forms of security to the participants. It was clear that there
could be no feeling of safety until there was some guarantee that collective and effective sanctions
would be applied promptly in the event of aggression. A prerequisite for such action was a
method for determining without delay which State was in fact the aggressor. The provisions of
the Covenant were vague and other early efforts at definition had been inconclusive.
While the Disarmament Conference was being prepared the International Law Association, the
Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the First International Congress of Penal Law, under the
leadership of Prof. V.V. Pella of Bucharest, urged that an international court be established to
deal with international crimes, and particularly with aggression. |90| On September 24, 1927 the
Assembly resolved "That all wars of aggression are, and always shall be, prohibited" and
denounced wars of aggression as '"an international crime". (DOCUMENT 5) No definition of
aggression was attempted, but the subject attracted growing attention by the Committee on
Arbitration and Security.
Mr. Politis, the Rapporteur dealing with the security question, presented a comprehensive
overview of the prevailing situation. (DOCUMENT 6) He recognized that security depended
upon guarantees: 1) That a State would not be attacked; and 2) That if attacked it would receive
prompt and effective aid from other countries. This was the scheme behind Art. 10 and 16 of the
Covenant. The requirement of unanimity by the Council was only one of the elements making the
outcome uncertain. Disarmament depended upon security, and security, according to the
Committee, was dependent upon arbitration. All were interdependent. Not only did states have
to be free from the danger of aggression but they would also have to be free from the fear of
aggression, if they were expected to disarm.
Mr. Politis recognized that a world security pact would be desirable but, in the light of past
experience, he did not consider that feasible. Instead he urged that there be created a series of
regional pacts to supplement the existing treaties then being concluded among many states in
search of mutual security. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923, the Protocol of 1924,
and the Rhine Pact of 1925 could serve as useful models for new regional treaties which would
exclude recourse to war, establish procedures to settle disputes without violence, and prescribe
a system of mutual assistance in the event of breach. He noted that:
"It will be essential to make it quite plain that the condemnation related only to aggressive
war ... Force may still be resorted to for purposes of legitimate defense, in the application
of Art. 16 of the Covenant, in execution of a decision of the Assembly or Council of the
League, or when action is undertaken, in virtue of Art. 15, Par. 7, of the Covenant,
against a State guilty of aggression". |91|
For the purposes of a regional security pact Mr. Politis felt that it would be sufficient, despite the
difficulty of determining unprovoked aggression, to say that the term "aggressor":
"shall be applicable to any contracting state that resorts to force in violation of the
undertakings entered into by it in the regional pact; for example, if it offers armed
resistance to a final decision".
Mr. Rutgers submitted a Memorandum on Articles 10, 11 and 16 of the Covenant. |92| In dealing
with the question of defining aggression he concluded that he did not feel called upon to offer a
precise definition but considered it more practical to "enumerate some of the facts which,
according to circumstances, may serve as evidence that aggression has taken place". He felt that
any attempt to lay down rigid or absolute rules would, in the existing circumstances, not lead to
any practical result. "It must be recognized" said Mr. Rutgers, "that the results which it (the
Council) will obtain cannot be regarded as complete or as applicable to every case. A particular
act may be deemed to raise, or not to raise, a presumption of aggression having regard to the
circumstances under which it was committed." |93|
In searching for criteria which would be useful in determining acts of aggression, Mr. Rutgers
looked to past treaties, the proceedings of the Assembly and Council, and the records of the Draft
Treaty of Mutual Assistance. These were extracted to include: "Invasion", "attack on a
considerable scale launched by one State on the frontiers of another State", "a surprise attack by
aircraft ...with the aid of poisonous gases", "actual industrial and economic mobilization, carried
out locally or by persons or societies on foreign territory", "secret military mobilization by the
formation of irregular troops, or by pretending that there was the danger of war and using that
as a pretext for commencing hostilities", "air, chemical or naval attack", "the presence of armed
forces ... on the territory of another", or the refusal to withdraw behind a line indicated by the
Council. A "definitely aggressive policy" and a refusal to let the Council or the Permanent Court
decide the issue were additional factors to be considered.
To these elements, which the Special Committee of the Temporary Mixed Commission had
already listed, the Rutgers Committee added that the violation of certain undertakings would also
signify aggression, such as the refusal to abide by agreed methods for the pacific settlement of
disputes or to observe military restrictions which had been accepted. |94| The Committee listed many
of the treaties which contained military restrictions such as the partial demilitarization of certain
areas, and noted that a violation "would in many circumstances in the absence of any express
stipulation raise a presumption of aggression". |95|
Mr. Rutgers agreed with Mr. Politis that the violation of a demilitarized zone, such as set forth
in the Rhine Pact, would justify the legitimate right of defense, but it was coupled with the
condition that it be "an unprovoked act of aggression" requiring immediate defensive action to
meet the assembly of forces by the other side. The Committee endorsed the rules laid down in the
Rhineland Pact, according to which the guarantor states could intervene immediately in case of
a "flagrant violation" of the demilitarized zone, providing it was considered an "unprovoked act
of aggression" calling for immediate response. The Council would then be seized of the question
and could by unanimous decision, excluding the belligerant parties, determine the issue. The
provisions of the Protocol of Geneva were also referred to approvingly, according to which the
burden of proof was to be shifted, and a state was to be presumed the aggressor, unless the
Council unanimously decided otherwise, if the State refused to accept the procedure for pacific
settlement, violated an injunction of the Council, or disregarded a decision that the dispute was
a purely domestic matter.
"It is clear", said Mr. Rutgers, "that the nature and extent of the cooperation which the parties to
the dispute are willing to afford to the Council cannot fail to exercise considerable influence upon
the decision of that body". The degree of cooperation therefore was to be another indicator of
aggression.
In considering how to implement the Council's broad authority under Art. 11, to "take any action"
to safeguard the peace, Mr. Rutgers felt that no code of procedure could be established as a
guide. "The infinite variety of events that may occur in political life cannot be confined in advance
in watertight compartments". |96| The role recommended to the Council was to keep in close touch
with the situation through its Members and their diplomatic agents, and to try to reconcile
differences by reminding the parties of their treaty obligations, by sending commissions of inquiry,
by trying directly to settle the issues, and by trying to mitigate the effects of any rupture which
might have taken place. Having thus become deeply involved in trying to prevent, limit, or put an
end to the hostilities, it was felt by the Committee that the Council's interaction with the problem
would make it possible for the Council Members to determine which State was really the
aggressor. Said the committee:
"It is not necessarily the State to whose conduct the crisis was originally due which is to
be regarged as the aggressor; in certain eventualities it might possibly be the other party
which ought to be regarded as the aggressor, if it has deliberately refused to conform to
the Council's recommendations ". |97|
It was noted that the recommendation of the Council would not only influence the parties and face
them with the possibility that failure to comply would trigger coercive measures against them, but
it would also serve as a source for influencing public opinion.
"It must be recognized", said Mr. Rutgers, "that it would be extremely desirable to arrive at a
generally accepted interpretation which would put an end to many controversies". |98| The trouble
was that there were no rules, and Mr. Rutgers feared that the existence of hard and fast criteria
would force a nation to decide whether there had been "resort to war" at a time when there was
still room for doubt, and thereby destroy the possibility for mediation by the Council before
hostilities began. In short, clear cut criteria might hamper the chances for a peaceful settlement.
The Rutgers Committee concluded:
"A hard-and-fast definition of the expression 'aggression' (Art. 10), and 'resort to war'
(Art. 16) would not be free from danger, since it might oblige the Council and the
Members of the League to pronounce on a breach of the Covenant and apply sanctions
at a time when it would still be preferable to refrain for the moment from measures of
coercion. There would also be the risk that criteria might be taken which, in unforeseen
circumstances, might lead to a State which was not in reality responsible for hostilities
being described as an aggressor". |99|
After noting that committee members had differed, the Assembly adopted the resolution put forth
by the Committee, which simply stated that the criteria of aggression contained in the Committee's
documents usefully summarized the studies previously made. |100|
The Arbitration and Security Committee, finding itself bogged down in general discussions about
ambiguous phraseology, and recognizing the impossibility of making any substantial progress in
having the major powers accept binding interpretations, turned its attention to the drafting of a
wide assortment of Model Treaties which States might choose if they were inclined to seek their
security safeguards by such means.
A "General Act" called for the pacific settlement of all disputes by arbitration, conciliation or
judicial determination, or a combination of all three. A choice of treaties or conventions gave the
signatories the option of coupling the renunciation of force, with guarantees of mutual assistance
against a violator. The Model Treaties of non-aggression, either on a collective or a bilateral basis,
provided that the parties would not "attack or invade each other or resort to war". A specific
exception was made, however, if the action was taken as part of a right of legitimate defense in
opposing an attack, invasion or act of war. Force was also permissible if taken pursuant to Article
15 Paragraph 7 and Article 16 of the Covenant, or pursuant to a decision of the Assembly or the
Council. The Assembly of 1928 approved and recommended the nine models presented for
selection. |101| The General Act was the only one which actually came into force, only to be
repudiated a few years after its birth.
(c) The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, (The Kellogg-Briand Pact) (1928)
The work of the League was overshadowed by the leading international event of 1928. On the
10th anniversary of the U.S. entry into the war the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, had
sent a message to the American people calling for an agreement with the United States mutually
outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. |102| The United States had thereupon of such a
treaty prepared its own draft and circulated it to a number of governments on June 23, 1928. It
was accompanied by an explanatory note, which stated:
"There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in
any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is
inherent in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions
to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether
circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense ... Express recognition by treaty of
this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort
to define aggression. It is the identical question approached from the other side. Inasmuch
as no treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defense, it is not in the interest
of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense since it is far
too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed definition". |103|
The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an instrument of National Policy, popularly
known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the Pact of Paris, was signed in Paris on August 27, 1928.
(DOCUMENT 7) It was eventually ratified by almost all of the countries of the world. It
consisted of only two brief articles. Recourse to war was renounced as an instrument of national
policy, and the parties pledged that the solution of all disputes would never be sought except by
pacific means.
The interpretation which the U.S., and Great Britain, put on the treaty destroyed the hope that
it could really be effective in achieving its noble goals. The U.S. right to self-defense encompassed
not merely the territory of the U.S. but also any other area in which the U.S. decided that it had
a vital interest. The British considered their domain to include all territories under British
sovereignty. |104| Under such circumstances it was obvious why there was no desire to define
aggression. Almost every act of war could be justified under the guise of self-defense. A war of
aggression would never again be waged except in self-defense. The Pact was, in fact, a plan for
maintaining the peace by guaranteeing the status quo. It was doomed to failure but that became
apparent only later.
(4) The Road to World War Two
The world economic crisis of 1929 diverted public attention from the problems of disarmament.
The United States and Great Britain were working on arrangements to diminish the size of their
Navies and the League's Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference remained
nearly paralyzed. German proposals to improve the means of preventing war by having states
agree in advance to accept the recommendations of the Council were debated, together with
Finland's plan to arrange for funds in advance which might be available to any state threatened
with aggression. |105| Problems of minorities and reparations were in the fore. Nationalism and
militarism were on the rise. At the end of 1930 the Preparatory Commission closed five years of
its work. Its disarmament proposals inspired no enthusiasm.
When the Assembly met in 1931 it was in an atmosphere of gloom. A sub-committee had been
set up to consider amendments to the Covenant, in order to bring the Covenant into harmony with
the Pact of Paris. The Rapporteur was M. Henri Rolin of Belgium, and his report considered the
question of self-defense and aggression.
M. Rolin concluded:
"... in the present state of the law, the satisfactory enumeration of the distinctive
characteristics either of aggression or of legitimate self-defense appears difficult and even
impossible". |106|
He referred to the report which M. de Brouckere had made in 1926 which had noted some of the
difficulties in drawing the line between aggression and self-defense. A victim of aggression could,
for example, become the aggressor unless the defense was "proportionate to the seriousness of
the attack and justified by the imminence of the danger".
The Committee felt that "assistance given spontaneously by a Member of the League to another
Member which has been the victim of flagrant aggression would not constitute a violation of the
prohibition of recourse to war". The intervening state, once having decided who was the
aggressor, did not have to wait for a decision Council of the on that subject, but could apply the
sanctions foreseen in the Covenant. What those sanctions might be was best left to the individual
Member's discretion. The Committee saw no acceptable way to improve the situation. States were
not ready, even theoretically, to increase their obligations, and the Committee felt there was no
viable alternative but to rely on the good faith of the Members. |107|
A General Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War was signed in Geneva on Sept.
26, 1931, by representative of 22 States, but it contained nothing more than precautionary steps
designed to prevent incidents from growing into wars. |108|
The Assembly, not knowing what else it could do, looked for action to the Disarmament
Conference which was scheduled to take place in February 1932. Before the Disarmament
Conference could meet, Japan, in clear violation of the restrictions against the use of armed force
in both the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, invaded Manchuria. Japan argued that she was acting
against lawless elements in self-defense, to protect her vital interests in line with the doctrine
expressed by the U.S. and British governments when they ratified the Pact of Paris! |109|
Under the League's interpretation of Article 11 of the Covenant, unanimous action by the Council
was required before it could take any action to safeguard the peace. With Japan in opposition, the
Council was legally stymied. The United States was not ready to risk coercive action against
Japan. Britain, also in the midst of a depression, would not act alone, and France, fearing a
rearmed Germany, had no desire to engage Japan as an additional enemy. Russia feared to offend
Japan. Without any one of the major powers being willing to take coercive action, or to apply the
sanctions envisaged by the Covenant, it became all too obvious that the League was only a paper
tiger.
As the Disarmament Conference was assembling, Japan extended its attack to Shanghai. China,
as authorized by Art. 15 of the Covenant, called for action by the Assembly. A time-consuming
investigation was made in an attempt to settle the dispute. The League, after an objective report
was received, rejected the arguments of self-defense. |110| On March 27, 1933 Japan withdrew from
the League. The demonstration of power by Japan exposed the weakness of the League. What
most states considered to be a clear act of aggression had taken place, vast territories had been
seized from a member of the League, and the League proved itself impotent to do anything about
it. The rift in the wall of the League would soon bring the entire structure tumbling down.
The Worldwide Disarmament Conference, which had been planned and hoped for since the end
of the war, was attended by all of the 64 nations of the world, with the exception of 4 small Latin
American countries. France began by putting on the table an elaborate plan according to which
the most dangerous weapons would be set aside to be used only in self-defense or on orders of
the League's Council. A standing international police force would be created for use by the
Council. Compulsory arbitration would be required. Aggression would be defined, and an
effective system of sanctions would apply in case of breaches of either the anticipated new
Disarmament Convention or the Covenant. (DOCUMENT 8) The plan was far ahead of its time.
In 1932 the great powers caught up in internal political turmoils, suffering from economic
uncertainties and beset by fears, were not prepared to accept any such commitments.
During the first year of its existence the Disarmament Conference was bogged down in debates
about which weapons could be classified as defensive or offensive, and whether adequate security
against aggression could be provided if such weapons were eliminated or reduced. Germany
withdrew from the Conference until a formula was presented which seemed to assure her that she
would receive equality of rights. While they were talking disarmament, most of the major powers
were, despite major depressions, rearming. A war was in progress and a greater war was already
brewing.
On November 14, 1932 France put forth a new proposal for collective security, prohibiting
economic relations with the aggressor and refusing to recognize any situation brought about in
violation of an international undertaking. There would be a right to assistance in case of
aggression and a special fact-finding commission to report to the Council. |111| This too came under
consideration in 1933.
Despairing of any effective action by the Disarmament Conference, the Soviet Union continued
to enter into treaties of non-aggression with its neighboring States. The Treaty with Finland
declared:
"Any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political
independence of the other High Contracting Party shall be regarded as an act of
aggression, even if it is committed without declaration of war and avoids warlike
manifestations." |112|
It was thereby recognized that a declaration of war might be irrelevant and that aggression could
take many forms. The Soviet Treaty with Latvia spoke of "any act of aggression directed against
the other" and "acts of violence directed against the territorial integrity and inviolability or the
political independence of the other." |113| The use of different terms implied that there was a
distinction between acts of "aggression" and acts of "violence." The Treaty with Estonia
prohibited "political agreements manifestly directed in an aggressive sense against the other
party." |114| The Treaty with Poland prohibited ''aggressive action.'' |115| Nowhere were these
distinctions explained, and it must have occurred to some of the parties that until there was a more
precise formulation the effectiveness of such treaties was questionable. It would not be long
before the Soviet Union would seek to correct the shortcoming.
The existence of a disarmament conference did not deter the major powers from channelling arms
to two South American states actively engaged in hostilities. Between Paraguay and Bolivia lay
a large undeveloped region known as The Chaco. Each country claimed it, and eventually the
border skirmishes exploded into war. Both belligerants were members of the League bound to
uphold the Covenant and both had ignored the obligation to submit the dispute to peaceful
settlement. The League was brushed aside as the parties tried to settle the dispute by force of arms
or via various commissions of South American States acting under U.S. domination. |116|
In May 1933 Paraguay, in an attempt to stop the flow of munitions to Bolivia, formally declared
the existence of a state of war. When the League intervened by sending a Commission to the
scene, the proposals of the Commission were rejected by Paraguay. Her neighbors were not ready
to impose sanctions by breaking off economic and financial relations. The Assembly urged an arms
embargo only against Paraguay. In response Paraguay notified its decision to withdraw from the
League. When peace came a few years later it was not as a result of the effective functioning of
the League but rather a consequence of the exhaustion of both parties. |117|
In a territorial dispute between Colombia and Peru, League action was equally ineffective,
although the conflict was settled before large-scale fighting erupted. |118| The lesson had been
learned from Japan that the League could be flouted with near impunity.
When the World Disarmament Conference reconvened in 1933 its prospects for success were
anything but inspiring. As the debate resumed on the French Plan for General Disarmament and
the Organization of Peace, the Soviet Delegate, M. Litvinoff, stated the position of his
government on the whole subject. (DOCUMENT 9) He noted that the U.S.S.R. was the only
country in the world which had destroyed the capitalist system, and which was being boycotted
by the majority of States. In such circumstances he felt that no State could be expected to submit
itself to the judgment of any international body composed of those who were clearly hostile to it.
The French proposal for international sanctions inevitably gave rise to the questions, "How is the
aggressor to be determined, and who is to determine the aggressor". |119|
While rejecting the impartiality of any of the existing agencies which might determine the
aggressor, the Soviet representative felt that should the establishment of such organs come up for
discussion it would have to be recognized that his government would be entitled to the same
measure of impartiality and fairness expected by other States. He did not anticipate that the
fulfillment of that legitimate demand would encounter much difficulty. The implication was that
an objective international forum would be acceptable to the U.S.S.R.
The key problem for M. Litvinoff was that there was no universally acknowledged definition of
aggression, and as long as there were different interpretations, and States continued to insist, as
had been done by the U.S. and the U.K., when signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, that they alone
could decide when they were acting in self-defense, no international tribunal would ever be able
to identify the aggressor in any armed conflict. Said M. Litvinoff:
"if we wish to see inaction the Briand-Kellogg Pact, together with the extension proposed
by the French delegation, and to secure the minimum of authority, impartiality and
confidence to the international organ to be called into life by these extensions, we shall
have to give it instructions for its guidance, and that means, first of all, defining war and
aggression and the distiction between aggression and defense, and once for all
condemning those fallacious justifications of aggression with which the past has
familiarized us". |120|
Mr. Litvinoff then presented a comprehensive definition of aggression for consideration. The
Soviet draft definition consisted of a preamble and three paragraphs. The Preamble recognized
the right of all states to independence, security, territorial inviolability and self-defense within its
own frontiers, and that the definition was a guide to an international organ which might be called
upon to determine the aggressor. The opening substantive article declared that the aggressor
would be that State which was the first to take any one of five different actions: (a) A declaration
of war; (b) Invasion of another state; (c) Bombardment of territory or attacking another State's
armed forces; (d) Landing armed forces on another State's territory, or remaining there longer
than permitted; and (e) Naval blockade. The Second paragraph, which was considered the most
important, listed various situations which were frequently used to justify aggression, and
specifically excluded them as a valid excuse for an attack. "No considerations whatsoever of a
political, strategical or economic nature", in particular the internal situation of a State or any of
its acts or laws, would justify any State being the first to take any one of the five prohibited acts
of aggression. It would be permissible under the Third paragraph, however, for an endangered
State to match the threat of mobilized armed forces on its frontier. |121|
It may be recalled that in 1924 the Soviet Union had opposed the Draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance, partly because they thought it impossible to define the aggressor. They recognized
then that a "first strike" might, under certain circumstances be defensive. |122| Now the picture had
changed.
"We make no pretensions to absolute definitions", said M. Litvinoff, "since such are hardly
possible or conceivable... We are ready to admit the imperfections of the document we are placing
before you; we are ready to listen to your objections, to advance and accept amendments,
additions and the like". |123| The principles which were important to the Soviet delegate were the
inviolability of recognized frontiers, and non-interference in the affairs, development, legislation,
or administration of another State. It would take over 40 years for the Soviet proposals, with
modifications, to be accepted.
The Belgian Delegation submitted a proposal on the fact-finding procedure to be followed in case
of aggression or threat of aggression. Both the Soviet and the Belgian proposals were referred
to the Political Commission of the Disarmament Conference. The reactions of some of the
Members can best be seen from some of the Minutes. (DOCUMENT 10)
The Chinese Delegate, representing a country which was widely regarded as being a victim of
aggression at that time, bemoaned the discrepancy between theory and practice. He was, however,
prepared to support the Soviet definition. Norway and France appreciated the Soviet reference
to international organs, and Poland approved the Soviet ideas. The German delegate noted the
deterent character of a definition but felt it should be more elastic. |124| Mr. Anthony Eden, speaking
for the United Kingdom, made it clear that he considered the attempt to draw up a precise
definition of aggression to be a waste of time. |125| Sweden favored increasing the Council's
powers, |126| and Japan wanted to be sure that all of the facts were considered. |127| The United States
representative also challenged the utility of a rigid definition. He thought it wiser to establish
criteria which each government might find helpful in reaching a decision on aggression. |128| His
interest in retaining independence of action was unmistakable. Italy shared the doubts of England
and the United States.
The question of defining aggression was accordingly referred to still another committee, the
Committee on Security Questions, consisting of 17 nations, under the Chairmanship of M. Politis,
which was also charged with considering the Belgian Proposal and a United Kingdom proposal
for consultation and good offices to prevent hostilities. |129|
The Politis Report of May 24, 1933 (DOCUMENT 11) proposed that the definition of aggression
be contained in a specific act which would become part of the proposed General Convention for
the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. The draft Act was annexed, and the report contained
a brief commentary on each of the articles, which were based on the Soviet definition submitted
by M. Litvinoff.
The preamble had been reworded without much substantive change. Which party was the first to
use force remained the decisive determinant of aggression, but a reservation was added making
the determination subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute. This was
aimed at safeguarding the possibility of taking steps prescribed by such other agreements as the
Covenant, without thereby committing an aggressive act. |130| The reservation brought a new
element of uncertainty, into the definition.
The acts which would constitute aggression remained essentially unchanged, although there were
slight improvements in wording and sequence. A declaration of war, invasion, attack on territory,
vessels or aircraft, with or without a declaration of war, naval blockade, and finally
"provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the
territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to
take in its own territory all measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance
or protection". |131|
The Soviet draft had spoken of "landing" or "introducing" armed forces into another State without
permission, or "infringement of the conditions of such permission". |132| The Politis Committee
varied not merely the terms, since "provision of support" was much broader, but it also added a
new concept, which had not previously been recognized, that the failure to take whatever steps
were within ones power to restrain armed bands was in itself an act of aggression. The Committee
recognized that the measures which were within a State's power to take would have to be
determined in each case, and this too was a new element of flexibility. |133|
Some members felt that the Soviet draft went too far in its article describing that no
considerations of any kind could be used to justify aggression. The Committee was prepared to
agree that:
"No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or
justification for the aggression referred to in Article 1".
but they preferred, with some reservations, to add a Protocol instead of the long Soviet list
illustrating the scope of the non-exculpating acts. They agreed that a listed act of aggression
would constitute sufficient "provocation" to justify retaliation by acts of a similar nature. |134|
Even within the Committee itself, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the U.K.
showed a preference for an elastic definition which would permit all the circumstances to be taken
into account for consideration by an international body which could either resort to arbitration,
if it could not agree unanimously, or could regard as the aggressor that state which refused to
cease hostilities. |135|
M. Politis also submitted a draft of a European Security Pact. (DOCUMENT 12) It did not seek
to impose new obligations of mutual assistance since such obligations would not have been
accepted. |136| It did, however reproduce certain clauses from the proposed Act Defining
Aggression, and hoped thereby to give it broader acceptance. What was omitted from the
definition was the listing of naval blockade as an act of aggression, since it was thought that
blockade should not always involve an obligation to provide assistance. |137|
The Politis Report came before the General Commission for discussion. (DOCUMENT 13) In
explaining his report M. Politis noted that the definition had the advantage that it warned States
of the acts they must not commit. Public opinion would now be able to form a judgment. The
definition would facilitate the work of an international organ charged with responsibility for
determining the aggressor, which by virtue of the definition would be less tempted to seek
political grounds to excuse aggression. |138| The definition was designed so that it could be accepted
by all States. In the absence of universality, however, it would only bind those agreeing to accept
its terms. Using force to assist a victim of aggression would not be aggression.
In declaring that more progress had been made in his committee than had been possible for the
past 10 years, M. Politis expressed appreciation for the Soviet initiative, even though the Soviet
Union was not a member of the League. He felt the progress was possible because they had
separated the definition of aggression from the question of sanctions which was a separate issue,
and they had separated the term "aggressor" from the term "war", which was itself ambiguous.
The definition dealt only with "resort to force" and not the existence of a state of "war" in the
strict sense. |139| This, said M. Politis, was the greatest success of the Conference to date.
M. Politis found no opposition to the Belgian proposal for the creation of fact-finding bodies to
investigate alleged acts of aggression. |140| As for the Act Defining Aggression, however, the
reception was, as expected, quite different.
Spain was clearly opposed. |141| Germany wanted more elasticity and picked up the discrepancies
between the Act and the draft of a European Pact for security in that the latter did not include
blockade as an act of aggression. A few days before President Franklin D. Roosevelt had sent a
message proposing:
"That all the nations of the world should enter into a solemn and definite pact of
non-aggression. That they should solemnly reaffirm the obligations they had assumed to
limit and reduce their armaments and, provided these obligations were faithfully executed
by all signatory Powers, individually agree that they would send no armed force of
whatsoever nature across their frontiers". |142|
This new development provided the German representative with the excuse to call for further
study and coordination. |143| Mr. Eden had already voiced the objections of Great Britain, which
were strongly shared by Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria. |144|
Wellington Koo of China supported the Act and felt that objections could be met by agreeing that
the enumerated acts of aggression were not exhaustive. |145| The main support for M. Politis came
from M. Paul-Boncour of France. He called the definition "one of the keystones, if not the chief
keystone, of the edifice of mutual international security...". |146|
In replying to the objections raised in two days of debate, M. Politis invited those who had
amendments to make them. With this opening the President called for some of the most articulate
advocates, Mr. Dougalevski of the USSR and Mr. Politis, on the one hand, and in opposition,
Mr. Eden of the U.K. and Mr. de Madariaga of Spain, to meet again and try to reconcile their
views. |147| Whether they ever met again does not appear from the available records. One conclusion
is clear they were never to reach agreement.
The atmosphere at the Disarmament Conference was one of confusion, mistrust and apathy. The
discussions in the Committees failed to influence what was happening in the world outside of the
meeting halls in Geneva. As Germany under Hitler began to mobilize and demand disarmament
by the other European countries or equality for Germany, those who considered themselves
threatened began to scramble for new alliances. |148|
The USSR sought to reinforce its regional security system with a ring of buffer states. On July
3, 1933 a Convention for the Definition of Aggression was signed by the USSR and Romania,
Poland, Afghanistan, Persia, Latvia, Estonia and Turkey, and later acceded to by Finland. It
accepted the precise wording of the definition of aggression as recommended by the Politis
Committee on May 24, 1933, "until such time as those rules shall become universal". Within the
next two days similar agreements were signed with Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Yugoslavia, and
then Lithuania. (DOCUMENT 14)
In September 1934 Russia joined the League in the hope that some League members might come
to her defense if Germany attacked. |149| On October 14, 1933 Germany, refusing to bow to the
"Diktat von Versailles" withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League. |150|
Rearmament and not disarmament became the order of the day.
In the following year nations were too busy planning to commit or defend against aggression to
be concerned with defining it. Italy's aggression against Ethiopia found the great powers in the
League too frightened, and too divided, to take effective action as envisioned by the Covenant
and the many subsequent treaties. They talked and argued while the Italian armies marched. The
limited economic sanctions which were applied were too little and too late. |151|
Man's attempt to set up a new world order of peace was now sliding down a very slippery slope.
It was Hitler's turn to defy the League. His remilitarization of the Rhineland violated the Versailles
Treaty and successfully challenged the Treaty of Locarno. The States affected, despite the legal
authority and the moral basis for action, pursued instead their own national interests and did
nothing to stop the German defiance. No State could rely on the Covenant or the League for
protection against aggression. King Alexander of Yugoslavia was murdered while on a state visit
to Marseilles in Oct. 1934. France urged the League to take effective action against political
crimes. The answer was to appoint a committee to prepare a convention against terrorism and for
the establishment of an international criminal court. |152|
Beginning in 1936, until the spring of 1939, German and Italian "volunteers" fought side by side
with rebels seeking to overthrow the Spanish government. The government's call for an urgent
meeting of the Council to deal with the clear case of aggression produced nothing but diplomatic
maneuvering. |153|
On July 5, 1937, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Turkey signed a treaty in which they all agreed to
refrain from any act of aggression against any of them. (DOCUMENT 15) The signatories
recognized the need to define aggression and self-defense. The treaty set forth specifically when
force was permissible and not permissible. Any one of 4 listed acts was deemed to be an act of
aggression: Declaration of war, invasion, attack against the territory, vessels or aircraft of another
State, or directly or indirectly aiding an aggressor. Legitimate self-defense was permissible, and
it was specifically defined as resistance to one of the listed acts of aggression. Action pursuant to
Art. 16 of the Covenant was not to be considered as aggression, nor action taken pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly or Council, or under Art. 15 of the Covenant, if it was directed against
a State which attacked first. Action taken to assist a State which was subject to attack in violation
of the Pact of Paris would also be permissible. Although blockade was not listed as an act of
aggression and assistance to armed bands was also omitted, each of the parties undertook to
prevent the formation or activities of armed bands within its borders, if such bands might subvert
the established institutions of the other. |154| The treaty was a very substantial improvement on
similar non-aggression pacts of the past, but adhesion to traditional views was still very strong.
By 1937 the committee of distinguished jurists which had been appointed in 1934, completed its
draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and the establishment of an
International Criminal Court. No State, other than India, was prepared to ratify it. |155|
The few remaining years of the League are a story of vacillation, apprehension and retreat. The
obligations of the Covenant became scraps of paper as States began to return to the international
anarchy which had marked the condition of the world before the outbreak of World War I. With
the world racing to rearm the question of disarmament disappeared from the agenda, and with it
all further discussion of the definition of aggression.
At the Harvard Law School a group of distinguished scholars were completing their work on a
Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression. Their study could
only define aggression in very general terms as
resort to armed force by a State when such resort has been duly determined, by a means
which the State is bound to accept, to constitute a violation of an obligation. |155a|
As each State declared that it alone would be the judge of its own action, all hope of collective
security was abandoned. In the face of threats of aggression nations praying for peace stood
paralyzed, and hoped that the threat would somehow disappear if sufficient concessions were
made. Czechoslovakia was annexed and the issue was not even brought to the League. On
September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland. The League was silent. World War II was on the
way.
On November 30, 1939, Soviet troops invaded Finland, seizing territory which the Finn's had
refused to lease, although deemed vital for Soviet defense. Finland and the Soviet Union were
bound by the Covenant, they were both parties to the Pact of Paris, both had signed a
non-aggression pact in 1932, and Finland had acceded to the 1933 Soviet Convention for the
Definition of Aggression. It was a perfect test case, and Finland called for a meeting of the
Council in accordance with Art. 15 of the Covenant. The Council and the Assembly acted.
(DOCUMENT 16)
An objective report set forth the violations by the Soviet Union of its treaty obligations and the
Covenant. The facts were compared with the definition of aggression. |156| "The Soviet
Government", said the Report, "is also directly contravening the very definite obligations laid
down in the Convention for the Definition of the Aggressor which it signed and in the preparation
of which it took a decisive part". |157|
In the 20th year of its life, for the first time in its history, in addition to appealing to its members
to provide material and humanitarian assistance to Finland, the Assembly and the Council declared
the Soviet Union to be no longer a Member of the League. |158| Some measure of financial
assistance was provided to Finland, but having already lost all respect and influence the League
could no longer be effective. Following upon the acts of aggression by Japan, Italy and Germany,
in which the League had hesitated to exercise its power, it was, in the words of M. Paul-Boncour
of France, "a tardy awakening of the universal conscience". |159|
The Assembly adjourned within the next two weeks and the League's agencies began to flee for
refuge to other parts of the world. The system of security which had been envisioned by the
Covenant had failed. Not having learned the lessons of history, and not being ready to take the
steps required to identify aggression and to repel it, the world was doomed to redouble and relive
the horrors of the past.
Notes:
1. In a learned text reviewing the quest for a definition of aggression Prof. Julius Stone concluded that the
hopes of securing peace by inventing a precise mechanically operating definition was "a snare and a delusion". Aggression and World Order, ix (1958). Professors Myres McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, in a brilliant
analysis of the factors which decision makers would have to consider in determining the limits of permissible and
impermissible coercion, rejected a defeatist view, and concluded that it was intellectually possible and practically
indispensible to clarify the policy of international coercion in order to enhance minimum order and optimum
human dignity. Law and Minimum World Public Order, Chap. 3 (1961). Other outstanding studies include:
Komarnicki, W., La Définition de l'Aggresseur dans le Droit International Moderne (1949); Aroneanu, E., La
Définition de l'Aggression; Exposé Objectif (1958). More recent studies to which the present author is also deeply
indebted include: Broms, B., The Definition of Aggression in the United Nations (1968), Thomas, A. and Thomas
A.J. Jr., The Concept of Aggression in International Law, (1972), Schwebel, S.M., Aggression, Intervention and
Self-Defense in Modern International Law, II Recueil des Cours (1972). [Back]
2. Harley, J., Documentary Textbook of the U.N., 2 (1950). [Back]
3. See Nussbaum A., A Concise History of the Law of Nations (1947); See Wright, Q., A Study of War
(1965), for an intensive historical study of war and related problems. [Back]
4. The Law of War and Peace, Vol. III, cap. 17, Sec. 3 (1625), cited in Scott, J.B. Ed. Classics of
International Law (1925) at 786. [Back]
5. Art. 2 Sec. 5. [Back]
6. See Note 4 supra at 560-561. [Back]
7. See Selections from the Work of William Penn. ed. I. Sharpless (1915), "Essay Toward the Present and
Future Peace of Europe" (1693). Reprinted in Int'l Conciliation, No. 394 (1943). [Back]
8. Jugement sur la Paix Perpetuelle, English Ed. Vaughan C.E. [Back]
9. World Peace Foundation (1914). Also Kant, Perpetual Peace, Smith, C. Trans. (1903). [Back]
10. The Work of J. Bentham, part viii, Bouring's Ed. "Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace". Also
Grotius Soc. Publ. Texts for Students of Int'l Relations, No. 6. (1927). [Back]
11. An Essay on a Congress of Nations, Carnegie End. (1916), See Beales, The History of Peace (1931). [Back]
12. See Scott J.B., The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907. [Back]
13. Malloy's Treaties II, 2020-2022, 2228-2229. [Back]
14. See Scott, J.B. The Hague Peace Conferences, I, 321-385 (1909). [Back]
15. See Marburg, T., Development of the League of Nations Idea, Ed. by J.H. Latane, 2 Vols. (1932). In
1917, it was stated that aggressive war was a crime against mankind. See Text on International Law, Academy
of Sciences of USSR, Moscow at 403. [Back]
16. U.S. Documents, Serial No. 7443, Doc. No. 765. See also Cong. Rec. May 29, 1916, at 8854, for a
typical Wilson speech saying: "... the world is even now on the eve of a great consumation... when coercion shall
be summoned not to the service of a political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order,
a common justice and a common peace." [Back]
17. See Smuts, J.C., The League of Nations, A Practical Suggestion (1918). For much of the background
material concerning the origins and growth of the League and its history see also Walters, F.P., A History of the
League of Nations (1960). [Back]
18. German White Book Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, 15-24, Carnegie Endow.
(1924). [Back]
19. See Glueck, S., War Criminals-Their Prosecution and Punishment, 19-36, (1944) for a summary of
action taken against war criminals pursuant to the Versailles Treaty. [Back]
20. See Memorandum of Reservations y the United States, 14 A.J.I.L. 95-154 (1920). [Back]
21. See Day, C. "The Atmosphere and Organization of the Peace Conference, in House and Seymour, Eds.
What Really Happened at Paris 16-18 (1921); For a comprehensive text see Temperly, H.W.V., A History of the
Peace Conference of Paris (1920) See also Miller, D.H., The Drafting of the Covenant (1928). [Back]
22. Art. 1. [Back]
23. Art. 4 Subsequent amendments increased the non-permanent members from four to six, and later to
nine. [Back]
24. Art. 5 [Back]
25. Art. 8, and 9. [Back]
26. See Walters, Note 17 supra at 61-63. [Back]
27. Id. at 48. [Back]
28. Art. 12. Later amendments made it clear that the court to which such disputes would be referred would
be the Permanent Court of International Justice described in Art. 14. For amended Covenant see Secretariat of the
League of Nations, Ten Years of World Cooperation (1930). [Back]
29. Art. 13. [Back]
30. Art. 14. [Back]
31. Art. 15. [Back]
32. Art. 16. [Back]
33. Art. 20. [Back]
34. Art. 21. [Back]
35. See LNOJ (1920). [Back]
36. See LNOJ 33-38 (1920). [Back]
37. See L.O.N. Records of the First Assembly, Third Committee, 10th Meeting, p. 764. [Back]
38. See Report of the Thirty -First Conf. of the Int'l Law Assoc. held in Buenos Aires in 1922, Vol. I, p.
74. [Back]
39. Resolution XIV. Text contained in DOCUMENT 2 (a) at 114. [Back]
40. Resolution XV. [Back]
41. See Art. 2. [Back]
42. See Art. 3. [Back]
43. See Art. 4. [Back]
44. See Art. 5. [Back]
45. See Art. 10. [Back]
46. See Art. 15. [Back]
47. See DOCUMENT 2 (a) 114-120. [Back]
48. Id. at 116. [Back]
49. Id. at 118; See also Zimmern, A., The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935 (1939) for
an analysis of the vacillation by Members of the League. [Back]
50. DOCUMENT No. 2 (c) at 183. [Back]
51. Id. at 183-184 Para. 4. [Back]
52. Id. 184 Para. 7. [Back]
53. Id. 184 Para. 8. [Back]
54. Id. 185. [Back]
55. LNOJ Spec. Supp.No. 16, 209-210 (1923). [Back]
56. See Cooke, W.H. and Stickney, E. Eds. Readings in European International Relations Since 1879, 946
(1931). [Back]
57. DOCUMENT 3 (b), Art. 1. [Back]
58. Id. Art. 2. [Back]
59. Id. Art. 3. [Back]
60. Id. Art. 4. [Back]
61. Id. Art. 5. [Back]
62. Id. Art. 6. [Back]
63. DOCUMENT 3 (e) at 197. [Back]
64. Id. [Back]
65. Id. at 198. [Back]
66. Id. Art. 3. [Back]
67. Id. Art. 4. [Back]
68. Id. Art. 5. [Back]
69. Id. Art. 6. [Back]
70. Id. Art. 8. [Back]
71. Id. Art. 11-15 [Back]
72. Id. Art. 17 [Back]
73. Id. at 204. [Back]
74. Id. [Back]
75. Id. [Back]
76. See Id. 204-205. [Back]
77. Id. 206. [Back]
78. Id. 209. [Back]
79. Id. 210. [Back]
80. Id. 212. [Back]
81. Art. 21. [Back]
82. DOCUMENT 4, Art. 1. [Back]
83. Id. Art. 2. [Back]
84. Id. [Back]
85. See Id. Art. 3,5. [Back]
86. See LNTS (1935) 335-357, Dec. 17, 1925. [Back]
87. See LNTS (1927) 152-154, Sept. 28, 1926. [Back]
88. LNTS (1931) 292-293, Oct. 1. 1927. [Back]
89. Cong. Record, Vol. 67, 2824-2825 (Jan. 27, 1926). [Back]
90. See Report of the 34th Conference of the International Law Association, 110 (1926); Union
Interparlementaire, XXIII Conference, 205-242; Premier Congrès International de Droit Pénal, Actes du Congrès.
Prof. Pella was to be the outstanding champion of the idea of an International Penal Court until his death in New
York in 1952. See 46 AJIL 709-710. [Back]
91. DOCUMENT 6, at 17. [Back]
92. Id. 24-40. [Back]
93. Id. at 25. [Back]
94. Id. [Back]
95. Id. at 26. [Back]
96. Id. at 28. [Back]
97. Id. at 31. [Back]
98. Id. at 32-33. [Back]
99. Id. at 40. [Back]
100. LNOJ, Spec. Supp. No. 64, 113-115 (1928). [Back]
101. See LNOJ, Spec. Supp. No. 63 (1928); Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Assembly
During its Ninth Ordinary Session, Sept. 3 to 26th, 1928 contains the Assembly Resolution at p. 16, and the
General Act at Annex 1, p. 20-26, as well as texts of the Model Treaties. At about the same time a Pan-American
Conference meeting in Havana resolved to prohibit all aggression and declared that a "war of aggression constitutes an
international crime against the human species". See Proceedings of the Amer. Society of Int'l Law 22nd Annual
Meeting, 14-15 (1928). [Back]
102. See N.Y. Times, April 6, 1928, p. 5. [Back]
103. See Proc. of Amer. Soc. of Int'l Law, (1928) at 143; Notes exchanged between the U.S. and other
Powers, inShotwell, J.T. War as an Instrument of National Poli and its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris (1929);
Miller, H., The Peace Pact of Paris (1928). See also Sohn, L.B. Cases on U.N. Law 935 (1956). [Back]
104. See note 103 supra, and Meyers, Origins and Conclusion of the Paris Pact (1929). For different views
see Wright, Q. "The Meaning of the Pact of Paris", 27 AJIL 39 (1933), and Borchard, E.M. Ed. Comment, "War
and Peace", 27 AJIL 114 (1933). [Back]
105. See Walters, note 17 supra. at 382. [Back]
106. LNOJ, Spec. Supp. No. 94, 145-149, at 146 (1931). [Back]
107. See Id. at 149. [Back]
108. L.o.N. Conf. for Red. of Armaments, Vol. II,3 13-321, Series of L.o.N. Public. IX Disarmament 1935,
IX:4. A violation of the restrictions was prima facie evidence of having resorted to war. See Art. 5. [Back]
109. See the LNOJ and Records of the Assembly and the Council (1932); Lauterpacht, "Resort to War and
the Interpretation of the Covenant during the Manchurian Dispute" 28AJIL 43-60 (1934); See also Willoughby,
W.W., The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (1935). Japan's "Doctrine", the Monroe Doctrine
and England's "Monroe Doctrine" are compared at 627-654. [Back]
110. See Hudson, M., The Verdict of the League: China and Japan in Manchuria (1933); The Final Report
appears in 27 AJIL 119-152 (1933). [Back]
111. See Conf. Doe. D-146, LN Conf. for Red. of Armaments, Conference Documents, Vol. II, 435, Series
of L.o.N. Public. IX Disarmament 1935, IX:4. [Back]
112. LNTS (1935) 395-399, Jan. 21, 1932. [Back]
113. LNTS (1934) 123-125, Feb. 5, 1932. [Back]
114. LNTS (1932) 305-307, May 4, 1932. [Back]
115. LNTS (1933) 49-51, July 25, 1932. [Back]
116. See Jessup, P.C., and Wood, B. The Chaco Award, The Independent Jour. of Columbia Univ. Dec. 9,
1938. See also editorial 33 AJIL 126 (1939). [Back]
117. See LNOJ, Spec. Supp. No. 132, 47-51 (1934); Spec. Supp. No. 133, 49; 28 AJIL 138-217, Supp.
(1934). See also Proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, Mar. 13-Sept. 13, 1929, Washington,
D.C. [Back]
118. See Woolsey, L.H., "Leticia Dispute Between Columbia and Peru", 27 AJIL 317-324 (1933), and 29
AJIL 94-99 (1935). [Back]
119. DOCUMENT 9 at 236. [Back]
120. Id. at 237. [Back]
121. Id. at 237-238 [Back]
122. See supra. DOCUMENT 3, at 138. [Back]
123. DOCUMENT 9 at 239. [Back]
124. DOCUMENT 10 at 52. [Back]
125. Id.. at 53. [Back]
126. Id. at 54. [Back]
127. Id. at 55. [Back]
128. Id. [Back]
129. Id. at 56; See Conf. Doc. D. 157. Mar. 16, 1933, Conf. Docs. Vol. II, p. 476. [Back]
130. DOCUMENT 11 at 4-5. [Back]
131. Id. at 16. [Back]
132. See DOCUMENT 9 at 238, Art. 1 (d). [Back]
133. See DOCUMENT 11 at 9. [Back]
134. Id. at 10. [Back]
135. See Id. at 4. [Back]
136. See DOCUMENT 12 at 4. The draft submitted by the U.K. provided that in case of a breach of the Pact
of Paris the parties would meet, but any action would require the concurrence of the major Powers. See Conf. D.
157 (1), Mar. 16, 1933. [Back]
137. DOCUMENT 12 at 7. [Back]
138. DOCUMENT 13 at 500. [Back]
139. See Id. at 502. [Back]
140. See DOCUMENT 12 supra. at 18. [Back]
141. See DOCUMENT 13 at 547-548. [Back]
142. See Minutes of the General Commission, Series B, Vol. II, p. 462, May 19, 1933. Text in Official
Documents, AJIL (1933) at 155; See Finch, G.A., Ed. Comment, "A Pact of Non-Aggression" 27 AJIL 725 (1933). [Back]
143. DOCUMENT 13 at 549. [Back]
144. See Id. at 550-552. The subject was also discussed at 510-517, which have not been reproduced as part
of the document. [Back]
145. Id. at 551. [Back]
146. Id. at 552. [Back]
147. Id. at 557. On June 18, 1934 it was reported that the recommended conversations to define aggression
had not yet been held. See Conf. D/C.G./C.S.S./2 at 14. In July M. Dougalevsky died. [Back]
148. See Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation signed at Rio de Janeiro, Oct. 10, 1933 by
six South American States, LNTS (1935) 405-413. In view of the U.K.'s refusal to assume any new obligations on
the continent, and hesitation by other States, only new regional arrangements seemed feasible. See Conf. D./C.G.
169 (1) July 5, 1934. Conf. Docs. Vol. III, April 1936. IX Disarm. 1936 IX.4. [Back]
149. See Walters, note 17 supra. at 579-585. [Back]
150. See Id. at 550, 565, 768. The withdrawal was made final and irrevocable on Dec. 12, 1937, a day after
Italy gave notice of withdrawal from the League. [Back]
151. See Serup, A. L'Article 16 du Pacte et son Interpretation dans le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien 58-100 (1938). [Back]
152. See LNOJ, 15th Year, No. II, 1760, 1839-1840 (1934). [Back]
153. See Padelford, N.J. International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife, 121-143 (1939). [Back]
154. DOCUMENT 15 at 27. [Back]
155. See Historical Survey of the Question of Int'l Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Memo. Doc. A/CN.4/7 Rev.
1 (1949). See also Proceedings of the Int'l Conf. on the Repression of Terrorism, Geneva, Nov. 1-16, 1937, Official
No. C.94.M.47. 1938 (V). Series of L.o.N. Publ. V Legal V.3. [Back]
155a. See 33 AJIL Supp. 821-909 at 811 (1939). The study also contains a comprehensive bibliography. The
Harvard definition was similar to one suggested by Quincy Wright in 1935. See "The Concept of Aggression in
International Law", 9 AJIL 373 (1935) at 395. [Back]
156. DOCUMENT 16 at 539. [Back]
157. Id. at 540. [Back]
158. See Id. at 508,540. [Back]
159. Id. at 507. [Back]
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