EQUIPO NIZKOR |
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17jul08
Text of the Ruling declaring admissible the complaint in the case of the Spanish victims of the National Socialist camps.
CENTRAL INVESTIGATIVE COURT No. 2
NATIONAL COURT [Audiencia Nacional]
MADRIDPRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS 211/08 L
RULING Given in MADRID on the seventeenth day of July two thousand and eight.
FACTS
FIRST.- On 19 June of this year, the Senior Court submitted to this Central Court a complaint submitted by Legal Representative Ana Isabel Lobera Argüelles on behalf and in the name of Mr. David MOYANO TEJERINA, Ms. Silvia DINHOF-CUETO, Ms. Concepción RAMÍREZ NARANJO and Mr. Donato JESÚS DE COS BORBOLLA, against Johann LEPRICH, Anton TITTJUNG, Josias KIMPF and Iwan (John) DEMJANJUK for alleged genocide and other crimes.
SECOND.- A ruling handed down on the previous 23 June authorized the opening of Preliminary Proceedings and transferred the case to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for a decision regarding its competence and/or interest in carrying out any investigation that it might deem appropriate. That step was carried out through a report dated 14 July 2008 that stated, verbatim:
"THE PROSECUTOR, carrying out the transfer conferred through the ruling handed down this past 23 June regarding the competence of the Spanish Courts to hear the case initiated by the submission of the complaint declares that:
1.- Whereas the complaint is being submitted because of acts that could constitute genocide and crimes against humanity, pursuant to Articles 607 and 607 bis of the Criminal Code.
The facts stated in the complaint are, in summary, as follows:
"In the National Socialist concentration camp of Mauthausen more than 7000 Spaniards were held as prisoners, more than 4,300 of whom died. This was also the case at the Sachsenhausen and Flossenburg camps. During the period between 1942 and April 1945, those camps housed thousands of people, among them numerous Spaniards. Having been detained against their will because of their race, religion, nationality or political beliefs, the prisoners were subjected to extermination programs designed by the National Socialist system. The prisoners interned in these three camps were subjected to extreme forms of mistreatment and abuse, including murder.
A significant number of Spaniards arrived as prisoners in deportation convoys from several European cities, and were subjected to inhuman treatment, violence... up to and including death in many instances.
The following individuals served as armed guards of the SS Totenkopf in those camps:
- Johann LEPRICH
- Anton TITTJUNG
- Josias KUMPF
- Iwan (John) DEMJANJUKAccording to the complaint, it has been certifiably documented in various reports and pieces of evidence that these individuals participated in the persecution and punishment of people being interned in the camp; they belonged to the Totenkopf SS battalion and served as armed guards in the various aforementioned concentration camps."
2.- As expressed in the Supreme Court ruling of 25 February 2003, "the extension of the principle of extraterritoriality of criminal law, as a consequence, is justified by the existence of the individual interests of each State, which explains why it is currently indisputable that there is international acceptance of a State's right to pursue the perpetrators of crimes committed outside of its national territory based on the principle of defense or protection of its interests, and on that of active or passive participation. In this case, the unilateral establishment of such jurisdiction acquires its fundamental, though not exclusive, meaning and foundation in the need of a National State to protect those interests."
As is stipulated in that ruling and was reaffirmed in the 8 March 2004 decision by that same Court, no State "is entitled to unilaterally seek to stabilize order, through recourse to Criminal Law, against everyone and around the world; rather, there shall exist a point of connection to legitimize the extraterritorial reach of its jurisdiction."
The prosecution of the act shall be limited by having to seek a point of connection with the interests of the state that seeks prosecution - in this case the existence of Spanish citizens - in the sense that the national jurisdiction shall be activated in cases in which the act was not prosecuted in the place where it was committed or by another Court, including an international one, in order to prevent offenses against the common interests of all States from going unpunished - which is the ultimate purpose of the principle of Universality of Criminal Law - a circumstance not present in the case at hand.
The aforementioned Ruling of 25 February 2003 and the one from 8 March 2004, state "that the principle of minimal intervention in the affairs of another state (Article 27 of the United Nations Charter) admits limitations in matters related to human rights, but those limitations can only be unobjectionable when the possibility of intervention is accepted through treatises between States [or] is decided by the International Community [sic]," whereby we must refer to what was expressly indicated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Thus, it shall be the Supreme Court itself, in its rulings of 25 February 2003 and 20 May 2003, as well as the ruling by the Constitutional Court from 26 September 2005 (Guatemala case), which establishes the necessary conditions whereby the Spanish courts can have jurisdiction and these require the existence of a logical connection with a Spanish national interest directly relating to the crime of genocide which it seeks to prosecute, whereby there exists a connection because of the victims' nationalities since the complaint charges the commission of the crime of genocide against Spaniards.
3.- We cannot forget that the Convention of 9 December 1948, on the punishment of genocide (to which Spain adhered on 13 September 1968, and which entered into effect on 13 December of the same year) provides in article 6 "Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction". As the Supreme Court in its judgement of 08.03.04 recalls with respect to this crime, article VIII of this Convention establishes that "Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide".
No international instrument, be it the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Committed Against Internationally Protected Persons dated 14 December 1973, the Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft dated 16 December 1970, or more recent ones such as the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism dated 9 December 1999, expressly provides for universal jurisdiction, which results in the need to interpret it in its legal terms and reach.
Consequently, considering the provisions of the said Conventions in the context of our art 23.4 of the L.O.P.J. [Organic Law of the Judicial Branch] of 1985, article 607 of the Criminal Code concerning Genocide and article 173 et seq. concerning the crime of Torture would apply to all those who engage in any of the acts referred to in these provisions, independently of where such acts were committed, provided always that there exists a connection with the State that seeks the action.
The category of crimes against humanity is a pre-existing category in International Law, which originated in customary law and establishes the prohibition of inhuman acts against the civilian population, as well as politically, racially and religiously motivated persecutions, ius cogens, imposing upon the States an obligation to prosecute and punish them. The prohibition against the commission of crimes against humanity has been part of customary international law in effect for many decades, with application erga omnes including with respect to Spain notwithstanding that the specific crime and its punishment were not incorporated into the Spanish Criminal Code until 2004.This prohibition was translated into Article 137 bis, and then into 607, and currently 607 bis, without interruption.
The legality principle applicable to international crimes such as crimes against humanity is not domestic, but rather international, as contained in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, which was ratified by Spain on 27 April 1977 (Official State Bulletin from 30 April 1977), according to which:
1 . No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
The current Criminal Code can be retroactively applied to prior conduct which was already criminal under international criminal law when it was committed; that is to say conduct which was criminal because it was prohibited by customary international law at that time notwithstanding that it was not defined in the Spanish Criminal Code.
International criminal law must be established having regard both to written conventional law, both national and international, and to customary law or the general principles governing civilised nations. Article 38 of the Statute of the International [Court of] Justice points to the following as sources of international law: 1.- The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
- international conventions
- international custom
- the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions and published doctrines, as subsidiary means.In cases in which a national court applies universal jurisdiction, it acts as an organ of the international community and such application is justified by international law.
Therefore, the principles of domestic legality and international legality that are applicable and in force for international crimes coexist. Spain has, without reserve, ratified the international instruments for the protection of human rights, in accordance with Article 19.2 of the Spanish Constitution.
Crime against humanity (prohibited by a norm of ius cogens) is a crime under international law independently of whether there exists under domestic law a specific criminal provision prohibiting it.
Thus, the ruling handed down by the European Court of Human Rights on 17 January 2006, confirming its doctrine, issued in the case of Kolk and Kislyiy vs. Estonia, makes reference to this issue stating that nothing shall prejudice the trial and punishment of a person for any act or omission which, at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. This is the case for crimes against humanity, regardless of the date on which they were committed. The ECHR also affirms that even in the situation where the acts would have been considered legal under domestic law in effect at the time, if the local tribunals have considered that they constituted crimes against humanity, as crimes originated in customary law, [they are] are internationally attributable to the subject who committed them.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, in Article 15.2, as previously stated, contains the principle of international criminal legality.
Finally, the Statutes of the International Criminal Court (Article 6 Genocide and Article 7 Crimes against Humanity), of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Article 4 Genocide and 5 Crimes against Humanity) and of the Tribunal for Rwanda (Article 3 Genocide and Article 4 Crimes against Humanity), crystallise this classification [of the offences], establishing their international characterization, as do various domestic laws such as that of the Spanish Criminal Codes of 1973 and 1995, the latter even broadening the crime of genocide in comparison with conventional international law.
5.- Pursuant to the stipulations of Article 23.4 a) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the matter at hand shall be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Spanish Courts, whereby the National Court is the court of competence in accordance with Article 65. 1. e) of the L.O.P.J.
As a result of the foregoing the competence of the Court should be accepted to hear the facts and admit the complaint formulated in order to carry out the necessary procedures with a view to clarify and investigate said facts."
LEGAL GROUNDS
FIRST. - The Constitutional Court, in its ruling of 26 September 2005, upon addressing the subject of controversy, which was nothing more than a ruling on the interpretation of Article 23.4 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, established two particulars:
The first is to remember and bring to bear what that same Court declared on two previous occasions, in ruling 21/97 of 10 February and, in particular, number 87/2000 of 27 March regarding the foundation of universal jurisdiction and, in that regard, it states that "the ultimate foundation of this attributive rule - referring to Article 23.4 of the L.O.P.J. - rests on the universalization of the jurisdictional competency of the States and their entities for the discovery of certain facts, the pursuit and prosecution of which all States have an interest, in such a way that its logical consequence is the concurrence of competencies or, in other words, the concurrence of competent States."
The second is to affirm the principle of Universal Justice that is contained in Article 23.4 of our L.O.P.J., in which there exists only one specifically stipulated limit, that of res judicata.
SECOND.- Article 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that "Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction."
Considering valid the reasoning that "a State's jurisdiction shall abstain from claiming jurisdiction upon acts that constitute genocide that are being tried in courts in the country where they occurred, or by an international court," the Constitutional Court adds that, to the contrary, in order to claim universal jurisdiction it would be sufficient to show, sua sponte or by the complainant, serious and reasonable indication of judicial inactivity that would constitute a lack of will or capability to effectively prosecute the crimes.
Therefore, briefly taking into consideration the doctrine cited in the Constitutional Court's ruling of 26 September, it is appropriate to conclude that:
A) The crime of genocide is, as stated in Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a crime against international law and
B) Article 23.4 of the L.O.P.J. acknowledges universal jurisdiction in the case of, among others, the crime of genocide, without any other limitations than those expressly recognized in the text of the cited article - 23.2 c) in relation with the end of [Article] 23 - that is, that the criminal has not been acquitted, pardoned or convicted abroad or, in the latter case, completed the sentence.
Consequently, it must be examined whether, in this case, the facts alleged in the complaint have the characteristics of genocide; second, whether they fulfill the conditions stated in Article 6 of the Convention and, finally; whether the case demonstrates a rational exercise of the law by filing in Spain the complaint that is the basis of these proceedings.
THIRD.- With regard to the first issue, it is necessary to state what Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines as such and restate that, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 1, the crime of genocide can be committed in times of both peace and war.
Article 2 states:
"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
- ( a ) Killing members of the group;
- ( b ) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- ( c ) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- ( d ) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- ( e ) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
Thus, it is sufficient to read the various sections where the acts committed and detailed in the complaint are systematically assembled to be able to deduce, without any doubt, that the facts described contain, prima facie, the characteristics and descriptions listed in Article 2 previously cited; all of this without prejudice to the fact that other types of criminal activity may also concur.
Regarding the second issue, that is, in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention on Genocide, the judicial possibilities stated therein, whether at the level of the territory where the acts were committed or in an international setting, as evidenced by the documentation submitted, we may conclude that it appears that in some way the corresponding judicial actions were exercised in the territory where the acts were committed. Additionally, with regard to the possibility that the accusers may appeal to the International Criminal Court, whose objective is already known and begins with the assumption that it is an independent - although linked to the United Nations - permanent Court with a potentially world-wide reach that may prosecute the crimes of most significance for the international community as a whole, and, among them, the crime of genocide, such possibility, in this case, is not feasible given that, according to Article 11 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court given in Rome on 17 July 1998, the Court only has jurisdiction regarding crimes committed after its establishment. The second paragraph states that when a State becomes a party to the Statute after its enactment, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with regard to crimes committed after its establishment when a declaration of acceptance of the Court's competence has been made. Thus, since the acts alleged in the complaint in this case took place prior to 1998, a response from the aforementioned international jurisdictional entity is not to be expected.
Regarding the last of the matters to be addressed, whether the current complaint can result in an abuse of the law by going to a Spanish jurisdiction and petitioning justice for a crime legally classified as pertaining to international law, according to Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the ruling of 26 September 2005 by the Constitutional Court states that "confirming that the requirements of domestic legal regulations are satisfied and dismissing the jurisdiction of the place where the alleged crime was committed and of the international community, as a rule, the jurisdiction ought to be accepted, unless there is an excessive abuse of the law given the complete non-correspondence of the issue given that it deals with crimes and places that are completely foreign and/or distant and not crediting the complainant or accuser a direct interest or relationship with them."
As can be easily deduced from the sense of the cited paragraph, an attempt is being made only and exclusively to avoid using the jurisdiction of this Court in an abusive exercise of the law and not to stipulate that the acts which are the subject of the complaint, the actual crime or the country where said acts occurred may or may not be far from ours. It is obvious to conclude that, in the case at hand, given the facts described in detail in the complaint, not only do the acts present the characteristics of a crime of genocide that must be investigated by the Spanish jurisdiction in accordance with the foregoing reasoning, but this jurisdictional entity has the competency to admit and process the complaint in accordance with the rules and principles established by the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 26 September 2005.
FOURTH.- Given the foregoing, and in accordance with the ruling of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the content of which is reproduced herein its entirety, for the sake of procedural economy, the complaint that gives rise to these proceedings is hereby accepted.
In consideration of the applicable general and pertinent principles.
ORDER OF THE COURT
His Honor RESOLVES: TO DECLARE THE COMPETENCE of this Court to hear the facts referenced by the present Preliminary Proceedings.
THE COMPLAINT submitted by Legal representative Ana Isabel Lobera ARGÜELLES on behalf and in the name of Mr. David MOYANO TEJERINA, Ms. Silvia DINHOF-CUETO, Ms. Concepción RAMÍREZ NARANJO and Mr. Donato JESÚS DE COS BORBOLLA, against Johann LEPRICH, Anton TITTJUNG, Josias KIMPF and Iwan (John) DEMJANJUK for alleged genocide and other crimes IS ADMITTED.
The following proceedings are ordered:
This proceeding shall be transferred to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for the appropriate procedural steps.
THIS ORDER IS TO BE TRANSMITTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, advising them that they may submit, before this Central Court, A MOTION FOR AMENDMENT within a period of THREE DAYS.
It is so decreed, ordered and signed by Ismael Moreno CHAMARRO, JUDGE of Central Investigative Court No. Two of the National Court. - I so attest.
THE JUDGE
THE CLERK
PERFORMANCE.- The order shall be immediately carried out. - I so attest.
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